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ABSTRACT 
In 1975, ECOWAS was formed primarily as a regional economic bloc. Through a careful 
remaking of the original treaty and the addition of new Protocols, it managed to metamorphose 
into a security organization that ultimately intervened in the humanitarian crisis then unfolding in 
the West African nation of Sierra Leone. This thesis argued the premise that the intervention was 
justified for two basic reasons. First, that ECOWAS’ founding treaty (including the Protocols) to 
which all 16 member countries are signatories, gave it the right to do so. Second, the doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect provided the legal, moral and diplomatic basis for the intervention. 
The utility of this study lies in the idea that it brings to the fore the concept of African solutions 
for African problems. The ECOWAS mission in Sierra Leone was the first of its kind anywhere 
in Africa, and it just may be the impetus needed for Africans to come up with novel ideas to 
resolve some of the myriad issues confronting the continent. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
To better understand the significance of ECOWAS’ intervention in Sierra Leone, it is important 
to understand the region’s political, social and economic landscape. It has been described by 
some as blighted by environmental degradation, corruption of every kind, disease, and grinding 
poverty. In a sense, Sierra Leone exemplifies some of these problems, especially the problem of  
precipitous political violence. Robert Kaplan, a journalist, underlines this apocalyptic doomsday 
picture of West Africa in his essay “The Coming Anarchy” written in 1994,  in which he 
describes the region as ‘…the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental and societal 
stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real “strategic” danger.’ 1  
To this depressing scenario he added the picture of a region beset by “…the withering away of 
central government, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease and 
the growing pervasiveness of war.”2 Much of what he wrote mimicked prevailing conventional 
wisdom which in hindsight, proved to be a bit of exaggeration. All the same, there were some 
elements of truth in these assertions as the region grappled with some real and interminable 
issues such as security threats, low levels of economic development , political instability and lack 
of social cohesion. If there were problems, which undoubtedly there were, the question then 
becomes what to do about them.  
There is no shortage of literature professing well intentioned “solutions” to these problems, but a 
great deal of it is thoroughly de-contextualized, meaning that the sort of “corrective measures”  
being proposed and implemented either fail to factor in the African experience [which often 
means that Africans are drafted in only as front men and women] or are based totally on foreign 
templates. In terms of economic development and security for instance, the emphasis “… should 
be about building viable and sustained structures,… owned by African peoples  and 
communities.”3 This view informs the paper’s attempt to demonstrate that complex socio-
cultural phenomena,  economic development  and security models within the  African setting  are 
                                                          
1
Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly 273 (1994): 44-77. 
2
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3
 David J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006) 2. 
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not necessarily amenable to the conventional dictates of  Western typologies. It is the position of 
this paper that the outcome of political attempts to resolve social and political conflicts in the 
African context is more likely to be positive if the initiative to resolve them are proposed and 
implemented by Africans themselves. If the problematical  history of the prevailing paradigm 
which sees African issues through Western lenses is any guide, then alternative conceptual 
approaches to conflict in West Africa like the one being proposed here,  deserve at the very least, 
more than a passing academic interest.  
Consequently, West African military intervention in Sierra Leone is analyzed in this light. This 
was the second military adventure in the space of a few years that ECOWAS had undertaken, 
although some may argue that this and the earlier Liberian mission constitute different stages on 
the same continuum. Whichever way one looks at it, the involvement of ECOWAS can be 
construed as the beginnings of a paradigm shift away from notions that effectively define 
security in terms of external [American and European] military arrangements. This new 
paradigm practically sidelines international guarantees of the inviolability and the territorial 
integrity of the nation state except under rigidly defined circumstances. Now, it favors a 
philosophy based on robust military engagement by regional powers in the face of destabilizing 
inter or intra state conflict.  
Significantly, there is no comparable history of regional military intervention anywhere on the 
African continent. There is therefore the real danger that this experiment could set a dangerous 
precedence with ramifications not yet fully understood. If this kind of interventionism is 
accepted as a legitimate manifestation of interstate engagement, so called “weak states” have 
every reason to feel threatened by an international regime that legalizes the breach of the 
territoriality and sovereignty of the nation state. This is even more apparent if one considers the 
fact that in practical terms, only the “strong” can intervene in the affairs of the “weak” and not 
vice versa. This conclusion is based on the most commonly used model of conflict 
resolution/peace enforcement in the third world which, as a rule, revolves around 
economic/military sanctions or peacekeeping, both usually underwritten by big powers and/or 
multi-lateral institutions like the UN. Although this model does not exactly define political 
sovereignty as sacrosanct, it at least gives countries in conflict a say in the decision making 
process, albeit in a purely academic or theoretical sense. The  question is, is the Westphalian 
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model more viable than the collective regional security model  deployed by ECOWAS? The 
thesis shows that although so called “weak” states may have legitimate concerns, the “new” 
model yields better dividends all round. 
 The essay is built on two core arguments.  The first hinges on empirical evidence suggesting that 
solutions to African conflict situations based on foreign archetypes are not particularly useful , 
given that their point of departure, for the most part, is built on uncritical ignorance
4
 of  the 
continent. Negative views, such as those that see Africa as “…no historical part of the world… 
has no movement or development to exhibit,”5 do very little to enhance our understanding of the 
issues facing the continent. The second argument justifies the intervention in Sierra Leone under 
the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter referred to as R2P).  To do this, the thesis 
traces the history of ECOWAS, its creation and expanding mandate. It also touches on the 
political economy of the Sierra Leonean state including analysis of circumstances leading to  the 
conflict, and its historical antecedents. Also included in the analysis are the many contemporary 
trigger issues like democratic deficit leading to a culture of strongman rule both military and 
civilian, and the patrimonial style of resource distribution. This is followed by a comprehensive  
look at ECOWAS’ motivation for launching this military intervention within the conceptual 
framework of its own rules and regulations, and the rules and regulations of other international 
bodies to which they belong. The significance of this lies in the novelty of ECOWAS’ 
organizational structures as it pertains to security and the historicity of the ideas behind the 
decision to intervene.   
The paper is organized into six different but interrelated chapters. The introduction lays out a 
detailed explanation of the focus, purpose, goals, central argument and methodology and 
organization of the thesis. This is followed by the chapter on ECOWAS. It traces its history as a 
regional institution (from its pre creation period through the various periods of mandate 
expansion and its gradual evolution as a mechanism for collective defense), culminating in the 
adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999. This protocol became the flagship document that 
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 Benedikt Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa: A Reappraisal ( Boulder: First Forum, 2009) 3 
5
 Franke 3 
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explains the Community’s thinking and its aspiration towards collective security, and provides a 
legal framework for its actions in the defense and security domains.  
Chapter Three provides the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis with a discussion of R2P. R2P 
generally postulates that old Westphalian notions of sovereignty and the nation state 
notwithstanding, the international community has a duty to protect non-combatants from the 
excesses of war if the individual state or states are unwilling or unable to do so. The thesis 
justifies the intervention within that context. The issues addressed include the obligation of the 
international community, to protect Sierra Leonean civilians and by extension the Sierra Leonean 
state which at the time, had all but ceased to exist. It also defines in specific terms what 
constitutes the “international community” in this context. 
Chapter Four deals with the justification for the intervention by tracing the relevant history of 
Sierra Leone, mapping a trajectory of  its gradual descent into political and economic chaos from 
a rather promising post-colonial beginning. As this is an international relations thesis rather than 
a purely historical documentation of facts, this historical analysis is guided by two claims. The 
first is that homegrown solutions provide the best chance of success in the region.  This is against 
the backdrop of the idea of “African solutions” to African problems which is just now beginning 
to rise to the forefront of the debate on Africa’s position in the world. In its basic form, this 
denotes a sort of Pax Africana that is protected and maintained by Africa itself.
6
 However, there 
is a distinct paucity of authoritative academic opinions on the issue. This aspect of the thesis 
seeks to make a positive contribution to the debate in the hope that the flame of the so called 
African Renaissance (AR) as espoused by such African leaders as Thabo Mbeki does not flicker 
out in the face of other competing ideologies of international relations. 
Chapter Five focuses on the intervention proper within the context of the doctrine of R2P.  
Also, in this same chapter, it will be necessary to conceptualize the precise basis of conflict in 
Sierra Leone. It has been variously described as conflict over alluvial diamonds or a violent 
reaction against the patrimonial state. This essay asserts that not all conflicts fit nicely into the 
straightjacket of academic theory and that this is the case here. The mastermind of the 
insurrection, Foday Sankoh, professed no known political or economic ideology. Much of what 
                                                          
6
 Franke, 2 
5 
 
is known about him now suggests that his primary motivation had very little to do with alluvial 
diamonds and even less with political ideology, although he and his movement profited 
handsomely from the sale of the gems. And so we would have to find other ways of defining him 
and his movement. The conclusion ties everything together into a singular thesis argument  that 
the model of intervention seen in Sierra Leone was a novelty whose template of a new and 
emerging security arrangement underwritten collectively by regional powers should be seen as 
desirable and capable of replication elsewhere.  
1.2 Methodology 
The qualitative methodology used here relies heavily on both primary and secondary resources. 
It identifies the key policy manuals of ECOWAS such as The Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention , Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and 
establishes the mechanism by which they provide the legal and theoretical basis for the regional 
quest for collective security. Memoirs by the key actors and public records of  individuals and 
the various State governments will help our understanding of the motives for war and at the same 
time help construct the argument characterizing the conflict and subsequent intervention as an 
interplay of a complex set of socio-cultural and political issues. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTION TO ECOWAS 
2.1 Introduction  
The chapter provides an historical overview of events leading up to the creation of ECOWAS, 
starting in its nascent years and ending in 2001 when the last of the significant protocols dealing 
with security and human rights were signed. It started with a simple desire for cooperation 
between the individual colonies during the period of European domination, when the West 
African mindscape was intrinsically regional in outlook. Unfortunately, the dearth of quality 
leadership to give meaningful expression to these aspirations meant that progress was slow. To 
compound the problem, colonialism and subsequently Cold War politics made it extremely 
difficult for aspiring patriots and nationalists to organize in pursuit of this goal. Despite these 
problems, a breed of leaders emerged who were more assertive and determined to make their 
voices heard. In the mid nineteenth century, “Africanus Beale Horton of Sierra Leone… had as 
early as 1867 called for ‘self government’ of Western Africa.”7 Towards the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, Edward Blyden , who most people consider to be the ideological 
godfather of the idea of West African unity,
8
 appeared on the scene preaching cultural 
nationalism. J.E Casely Hayford gave concrete expression to this ideal when he formed the 
National Congress Of British West Africa (NCBWA) in the nineteen twenties with political and 
economic objectives
9
.   
 After independence, Kwame Nkrumah, president of newly created Republic of Ghana, had this 
to say on the subject in 1964: “I see no reason why the independent African States should not, 
with advantage to each other, join together in an economic union.”10 When he commissioned the 
Volta River hydroelectric project a few years later, he emphasized that “…we are ready and 
                                                          
7
 Asante, S.K.B, Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of Econ. Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) (New York: Praeger, 1986) 45. 
 
8
 Asante 45 
9
 Asante 45 
10
 Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days In Ghana, (New York: International, 1969) 88. 
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prepared to supply power to our neighbors in Togo, Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. As 
far as I am concerned, this project is not for Ghana alone.”11 
This idea of West African unity was picked up on by the second generation of post colonial 
leaders, but they had to navigate the delicate waters of linguistic and political divisions.  This 
was due largely to French neo-colonialist and imperial activities in the region. The neutralization 
of the French factor as an impediment to greater sub-regional cooperation
12
 paved the way for a 
treaty to be signed in Lagos in 1975 establishing the Economic Community of West African 
States. Then the Cold War ended. This intervening event drastically altered the variables on 
which regional economic, political and security thinking was based. Suddenly, Washington, 
London, Paris and Moscow were unwilling or unable to bankroll their client states in West 
Africa. It would have been a benign undertaking to recalibrate their resources and thinking in 
response to this phenomenon if West Africa did not find itself under assault from a different set 
of circumstances. 
 The post Cold War period heralded the beginning of intense social, political and security 
upheavals across the region, some of it externally motivated. Imageries of the withering away of 
central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease and 
the growing pervasiveness of war,
13
 are undoubtedly exaggerations, but they provided a snapshot 
of the type of issues leaders had in mind when they shifted emphasis away from economic 
integration to collective security as a pre-requisite for the latter. The idea that West African 
intervention in Sierra Leone is justified under two different scenarios—ECOWAS’ own Charter 
and Protocols,  and the concept of The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)-- is argued against this 
backdrop.  
2.2 History of ECOWAS   
Efforts at political, economic and security integration in West Africa began in the early post 
colonial period, starting with the former Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah’s idea of a 
continental union government preceded by an African High Command. The objectives of this 
military construct (AHC), according to him, were threefold, namely to defend the increasing 
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 Nkrumah 88. 
12
 Asante 54. 
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 Kaplan 44-77 
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number of independent African States from imperialist aggression, to offer African states a 
feasible alternative to disadvantageous military pacts with Cold War powers and to spearhead the 
liberation of areas still under colonial and white supremacist control.
14
 Although some writers 
point to a much earlier beginning, for our purposes, this is a good starting point. Nigeria’s 
Abubakar Balewa led the opposition to the concept of African security integration on the 
grounds that economic integration must necessarily precede political union, probably reckoning 
that a future economically powerful Nigeria would be in a better position to shape the destiny of 
the region to its advantage. At the time, Francophone and Anglophone West Africa inhabited two 
parallel universes at the state level, aside from the lingering rivalries within the communities 
themselves, [Ghana and Nigeria within the anglophone axis, for example]. Nonetheless, 
incentives for broad regional cooperation and or integration were still potent. The first post- 
colonial attempt at integration, rather than mere cooperation, took place in the Nigerien capital of 
Niamey in 1966 attended by 11 regional states. At this meeting, several recommendations were 
adopted regarding the establishment of economic cooperation among the member states of the 
sub region.
15
 At a follow up meeting in Accra, Ghana in 1967, 12 out of the 14 independent 
states in the region adopted the Articles of Association of the West African Economic 
Community (WAEC) committing themselves to establishing a sub-regional common market. 
The actual protocol establishing the Community was signed in a follow up conference in 
Monrovia , Liberia in  1968. 
However, linguistic differences exacerbated by French post colonial interests in the region 
prevented any concrete steps from being taken in the aftermath of the 1968 conference. Seven 
francophone countries-- La Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Senegal, Dahomey 
(Benin), Niger, and Mauritania-- had previously formed in 1959, and reformed in 1966, a Union 
Duoaniere de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UDAO). In 1970, they went a step further by signing a 
protocol agreement signaling their intent to harmonize their common market in the form of a  
Communaute Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest(CEAO). In 1973, they formalized this intent 
by ratifying the treaty officially creating a brand new organization which came to be known by 
its French acronym “CEAO.” Togo, along with Dahomey, two of the francophone countries in 
the region, meantime were on the outside looking in. Their political leadership took a broader 
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 Franke 51 
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view of regional unity. Rather than pursue language solidarity, they opted to work to achieve 
regional integration across the linguistic divide
16
. Togo, being relatively tiny both in 
geographical and economic terms, formed a geo-strategic alliance with the much bigger and 
altogether richer Nigeria to announced an embryonic West African Economic Community in 
1972; it was to include all the geographical entities in the region at some future date.  
The francophone” CEAO” perceived this event as a direct and imminent threat by the Nigerian 
hegemon to their collective interests. They repudiated the nascent West African Economic 
Community at every turn and sought to strengthen their ties to the colonial power and also 
among themselves, and certainly to the exclusion of their anglophone and lusophone neighbors.
17
 
“CEAO’s” creation is seen by some as a politically inspired scheme by France to counter this 
perceived Nigerian desire for regional dominance.
18
 This is not totally unfounded since by some 
accounts Nigeria’s motivation for trying to bring together all the countries in the region under a 
single umbrella “…was prompted by [its] determination to consolidate and develop its own 
political and economic leadership in the region”.19 
Undeterred by the seeming recalcitrance of the francophone bloc of countries, Nigeria and Togo 
jointly set up a commission in 1973 to persuade the rest of the region through shuttle diplomacy, 
of the viability of their proposed brainchild, the West African Economic Community, WAEC. At 
a conference in Lome, Togo the following year, the original proposals of the commission were 
adopted by the assembled delegates from a substantial majority of regional states. These 
proposals served as the blueprint for a comprehensive treaty signed in Lagos by the summit of 
Heads of State and Government in1975, subsequently ratified by all 16 member countries, 
establishing ECOWAS. The general objective of the Community centered around promoting 
“…economic development by establishing a common market and harmonizing a variety of 
economic…and monetary policies”.20 Article 13 of the treaty provided for the “…establishment 
                                                          
16
 Ibrahim A. Gambari, Political and Comparative Dimensions of Regional Integration (New Jersey: Humanities, 
1991) 27. 
17
 Gambari 27 
18
 Gambari 27 
19
 Peter Robson, Integration, Development and Equity: Economic Integration in West Africa (Boston: George Allen,  
1983) 56. 
20
 Robson 99 
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of a customs union to be phased in within a period of 15 years.”21 When it was first chartered, 
ECOWAS was described with more than a little hint of optimism as “…the first potential success 
for Third World integrative enterprise”.22 The operative word here is “potential” as the 
organization embodied the hopes and aspirations of millions of its people in a region where very 
little of that type of thing existed before. However, this is not unique to West Africa as there are 
documented instances of similar ventures elsewhere in the third world.    
An interesting and important question is how did an institution set up for the express purpose of 
economic integration, evolve into its new role as a regional peace, security and conflict 
management and resolution mechanism? The question could also be asked how a collection of 
developing cash strapped economies in West Africa decide to devote colossal amounts of 
resources to security and peace initiatives instead of doing the obviously rational thing by 
investing the said resources in human development and economic infrastructure? 
The answer lies in a variety of historical happenstance. Initially, post-colonial and Cold War era 
security thinking in West Africa was dominated by the attitude, mistaken or not, that the 
superpowers and their allies would always provide security for the states and, in particular 
regimes that had close relations and were of strategic interest
23
 to Cold War politics. The end of 
the Cold War radically altered the global  dynamics of international relations. Suddenly, these 
Cold War era economic, political and military alliances that formed the bedrock of interstate 
relations in the region became very fluid and no longer carried the same strategic importance 
they used to, it least in terms of  superpower and major power thinking. With the threat  of 
communism gone, West Africa’s importance as a geo-strategic sphere for the West diminished 
considerably along with the need for client states. West Africa’s geo-strategic in the Cold War 
era is defined strictly in terms of the West’s determination to stop the spread of communist 
influence anywhere in the world. The implosion of the Soviet Union itself meant that even if it 
(Soviet Union) wished it, they had very little capabilities to project power outside their own 
borders, much less guarantee the security of any client state. Clientelism was on its last legs and 
the leaders of the West African sub region knew it. 
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 Julius E. Okolo, “The Development and Structure of ECOWAS.” West African Regional Cooperation and 
Development. Ed. Julius Emeka Okolo and Stephen Wright (Boulder: Westview,1990) 46. 
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Also, after centuries of colonial exploitation and another couple of decades of post-colonial 
manipulation and political and economic marginalization in which Africa itself was described as 
the “unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the 
globe”24, the regional leadership figured out that the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold 
War was one that should be seized to forge a new beginning instead of continuing the farce of 
depending on the benevolence and largesse of external benefactors to finance its development 
and build credible defense capabilities. 
However, the paucity of military and economic resources across the region meant that no one 
country had the wherewithal to ensure its own security in any meaningful way, with the possible 
exception of Nigeria. For reasons that were not totally obvious, the economic integration that 
was supposed to lift the region out of dependency, was proceeding at a snail’s pace25. At the 
same time, both internal and external security challenges continued to pose a real threat to the 
political and geographical constructs throughout the region. In the 1970s, “the sub-region was 
faced with the constant threat posed by violent and bloody military coups d’etat, interstate wars, 
border disputes, the Biafran civil war in Nigeria, extra regional interventions and foreign backed 
mercenary activities, such as in Cape Verde, Benin and Guinea.”26 The status quo being no 
longer tenable, a new way of thinking was required for the ECOWAS to remain relevant.  
In 1991, ECOWAS officially launched itself on a path of renewal and relevance in Abuja, 
Nigeria. In a document titled “Declaration of Political Principles”, ECOWAS set out a strategic 
vision of the future, “…deeply conscious of the rapidly changing international political and 
economic landscape”.27 The most pressing need at the time was the promotion of “…better 
relations among themselves…by ensuring a stable and secure political environment in which 
[their] peoples can live in freedom…under the law and in true and lasting peace, free from any 
threat to or attempt against their security…”28         
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 Anatole Ayisi, ed. Cooperating for Peace in West Africa: An Agenda for the 21
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The realization of the need for change, is not nearly sufficient in itself to bring about the desired 
change, although it could serve as a good starting point. West Africa’s desire for change was not 
going to happen simply because they wished it. It would only happen as a result of conscious 
pro-active efforts of the seekers of change. In this case, the sought for change must manifest 
itself in new and improved institutions and also in the lives of the people, and that entails 
managing it in a way that is both sustainable and beneficial. In 1993, the decision was made to 
revise the entire ECOWAS treaty to better reflect the new realities of the international system. 
These new changes coincided at the time, with a change in the dynamics of international 
relations that were considerably different from those in 1975, in part due to the incidence of 
radical global post Cold War political and security realignments.  
Although ECOWAS still held fast to the concept of “cooperation and integration leading to the 
establishment of economic union”29, these changes, manifested in their new charter, reflected the 
reconfiguration of priorities. This did not necessarily imply that the dual concepts of economic 
integration and security became mutually exclusive; on a rational and practical level, they were 
seen as rather complementary. This new “Security First” paradigm was to rival the necessity of 
economic integration but not replace it. The significance of the narrative here is the “…obvious 
linkage between security and development”.30  
In order to truly understand the magnitude of change at the psychological level wrought by this 
new treaty signed in Cotonou, Benin in 1993, it is necessary to contrast some of the key 
provisions of both the old and new documents. The old document contained 14 chapters and 65 
articles while the new one had 22 chapters and 93 articles. The old one focused almost 
exclusively on economic issues and customs union. The 1993 version added chapters dealing 
mostly with issues of peace and collective security. Article Four of the 1993 document 
articulated the very basic principles of the new organization. Ten of eleven principles in this 
section dealt in some shape or form with cooperative security and peace.
31
 
Another innovative aspect of the new treaty was the prioritization of security cooperation as a 
prerequisite for economic integration rather than the other way round. It also reaffirmed the 
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various existing protocols, the Protocol on Non Aggression, Protocol on Mutual Assistance on 
Defense, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. Taken together, they formed the 
basis of security and confidence building among member states. The 1975 treaty singled out 
industry, trade and culture as the main areas of cooperation. In 1993, they went further to 
institutionalize “…political, judicial and legal affairs, regional security and immigration 
issues”.32 In concert, these new additions represented a seismic shift from the original tenets of 
the organization and in the process forged a new identity for the old union. In the wider African 
context, the preceding period, from colonialism to the immediate post Cold War era, saw the 
entrenchment of state sovereignty and territorial inviolability as cornerstones on which the rules 
of engagement in the conduct of interstate relations were built. Then, security in the region  was 
perceived largely as external threats to political sovereignty and territorial integrity while internal 
factors such as bad governance, ethno-religious divisions, repressive internal state security 
apparatus, institutional corruption etc. were never seriously considered part of the discussion. 
The Cotonou Treaty served as the watershed mark. It recognized the rapidly changing political 
economy of the region and the need to address conflict instigating practices such as under-
development, institutional corruption and massive state sponsored human rights violation as part 
of the new strategic thinking. It took another six years of foot dragging and political inertia for 
the organization to develop, address and incorporate the preceding issues (internal conflict 
instigating factors) into the new document signed in Benin.  
 And when it happened, it was a significant departure from the moribund lethargy that existed 
before. As stated elsewhere, the original treaty did not make any meaningful provisions for 
cooperation on defense. The various Protocols dealing with the issue of security were added to 
the original document almost as an afterthought, a sort of concession to theoretical necessity. 
Beginning in 1978, ECOWAS came up with the first prototype document on defense 
cooperation, the Protocol on Non-Aggression. It enjoined the signatories to refrain from, among 
others, any acts or omissions that were likely to lead to interstate conflict. However, it did not 
address the question of interference from outside the region or indeed internal insurrection 
attributable to bad domestic policies. It was replaced by the Protocol for Mutual Assistance on 
Defense signed in 1981 but which only entered into force in 1986. In a sense, this was the first 
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real and concise effort at collective security, and it sought to correct the obvious shortcomings of 
the previous Protocol on Non-Aggression. 
 The Protocol for Mutual Defense stipulated that “units from the armies of ECOWAS countries 
will constitute an allied force of the community under a Force Commander.”33 This meant that 
for the first time ever, ECOWAS would institutionalize a fully armed, combat ready military unit 
capable of forcefully intervening anywhere in the region in the event of conflict.
34
 There were 
also plans to streamline logistics, troop movement, personnel and equipment. The document 
envisaged three scenarios in which the organization could be called into action: external 
aggression from outside the region, hostility between member states and internal conflict within 
member states.
35
 In terms of the third scenario, it came with the proviso that the community shall 
act only if the conflict is precipitated by external influence.
36
 This perhaps was a nod to the 
prevailing conventional wisdom of the era which effectively deified the concept of non 
interference and the territorial integrity of the nation state. However, it did not confront the 
endemic problems resulting from bad internal governance. Subsequent developments within the 
community would expose it as an instrument of rhetoric rather than effective action.  
ECOWAS’ very obvious shortcomings were exacerbated by the fact that existing political, 
economic and security arrangements between it and most of the rest of the world were based on 
unequal partnership, with West Africa mostly being the weaker partner. If the region was going 
to extricate itself from these exploitative and ultimately ruinous arrangements, it needed new 
tools. In terms of defense, the Protocol on Mutual Defense was clearly inadequate as an 
instrument of collective security, especially given the fact neither of these two aforementioned 
protocols [Mutual Defense and Protocol on Non-Aggression] were ever actually implemented.  
The fluid events of the Liberian civil war in the 80s for instance exposed its inadequacies faced 
with a complex conflict situation. The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, a sequel to the Protocol on 
Non-Aggression, was negotiated and promulgated in 1999 not only as a corrective measure, but 
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also as an all encompassing framework within which West Africa’s collective security would be 
realized. This framework was seen as the enabling instrument designed to tackle the same issues 
of interstate and intrastate security, but this time they were going to do it effectively using  
homegrown resources. These include not only using only West African armies, but they will be 
used to directly intervene in the internal affairs of member countries.  It set out to institutionalize 
structures and processes that will ensure consultation and collective management of regional 
security issues.
37
This, perhaps was precipitated by events such as the intense negotiations and 
lobbying among member states that preceded the decision to intervene in Sierra Leone. It also 
provided for, among others, the institution of Mediation and Security Council charged with not 
only taking decisions on peace and security, but also advising the Authority of Heads of State 
and Government,
38
 the highest decision making body of  ECOWAS.  
Still on the topic of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, some writers 
characterized it as the collective aspirations of people in the region to “institutionalize structures 
and processes that will ensure consultation and collective management of regional security,”39 
and allow for rapid response to crisis. Indeed, Benedikt Franke, a security consultant on Africa, 
declared that the document was “an imperative necessity which aims at creating the conditions 
that will allow West Africa to promptly react in situations of crisis.”40It is the first and the most 
“comprehensive and multi dimensional architecture for regional peace and security”41 on the 
African continent, and a vast improvement over previous protocols. 
 Some of the worthy innovations are found in Article IV, chapters 23 and 24. These articles 
provide for the establishment of early warning systems for conflict prevention and they were to 
be positioned in different zones across the region. The purpose of the ECOWAS Early Warning 
System [ECOWARN] is to “detect, monitor and analyze signs of threats or breakdown in 
relations within or between member states.”42 In other words, ECOWARN became a tool for 
threat perception analyses and risk mapping. Given the history of the neighborhood, this amounts 
                                                          
37
 Franke 66 
38
 Franke 66 
39
 Franke 66 
40
 Ayisi 19 
41
 Francis 172 
42
 Franke 198 
16 
 
to a giant capacity building initiative whose utility to the cause of conflict prevention cannot be 
overstated.  
Another positive development is found in Chapter 17. It reinforces the concept of mediation 
through the establishment of a Mediation and Security Council. It is liaised with the “Defense 
and Security Commission, Council of Elders and ECOMOG, with a mandate covering conflict 
prevention and management, resolution and peace keeping.”43 The Mediation and Security 
Council seem to play the role of an oversight committee, coordinating the activities of these 
other important organs to detect and mediate actual and potential conflict situations before they 
boil over. Failing that, ECOMOG exists to back mediation efforts with military muscle. It seems 
to be the most important of these new institutions, comprising brigade size combat troops from 
member countries ready to be deployed, and constituting a “…permanent peacekeeping and 
conflict management mechanism.”44 
The Mechanism is not just geared towards addressing offensive action in actual and potential 
conflict situations. Article 31 outlines the composition of an unarmed group of civilian and 
military personnel to be deployed as an observer mission
45
 to serve as a bulwark against 
belligerence in potential trouble spots. It also provides for a Special Representative of the 
Community who will serve as its chief diplomat in for instance negotiating an end to “complex 
political emergencies”46 before the use of force is contemplated. As a corollary, a supplementary 
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was negotiated in 2001. Although it dealt mainly 
with issues of democracy and governance, it also incorporated guidelines for civilian control of 
allied armed forces, the imposition of sanctions in the event of an abrogation of elective 
democracy or massive violation of human rights. Taken together, the Protocol Relating to 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and 
the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance form the basis of ECOWAS’ Conflict 
Prevention Framework, while ECOMOG provides the muscle for the kind of vision the 
organization sought to project at that point. The reason for the extensive expose on the 
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Mechanism is that the document’s existence is directly attributable to the events in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone.  
2.3 Conclusion 
 This chapter has two goals. First, it traces a brief history of ECOWAS, focusing mainly on 
episodic events that enhance our understanding of the organization. Second, it  charts the 
evolution of the organization from its beginning as a proposed instrument of  economic 
cooperation and integration. It evolved into a fully functioning tool of regional collective security 
demonstrably capable of serving the needs of its component units. In tracing this history, the 
thesis does not necessarily recount details of events in a chronological order. Rather, it merely 
sketches a broad historical outline, touching on significant issues and events, in so far as they 
contribute to our understanding of the organization’s evolution. These include colonialism’s role, 
the impact of the Cold War and its direct effects on the Community’s policy initiatives and the 
role of poverty, economic underdevelopment and political instability in shaping its core 
institutions. 
In mapping ECOWAS’ evolution, it is important to point out that the focus here is on security 
and defense arrangements, an area in which it has been a continental trailblazer on how to 
organize effective collective defense for the common good. Although it can be argued that a 
sequence of unanticipated events rather than design forced the hand of policy makers into 
prioritizing collective security over economic integration, the events in Sierra Leone were a well 
thought out reaction to an unfolding regional crisis. This chapter therefore helps refine the 
proposition that the intervention in Sierra Leone was justified and necessary, a natural 
consequence of ECOWAS’ evolutionary process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
3.1 Introduction 
The global political landscape is littered with instances of shocking humanitarian catastrophes 
perpetrated by governments against their own peoples and sometimes by states against other 
states. For the most part, the international community has been known to stand aside and watch 
as gruesome events unfold. This inaction has often been rationalized in terms of the hitherto 
sacrosanct concept of the territorial inviolability and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
sovereign states. The 1994 Rwanda genocide, the Russian invasion of Chechnya, the Pol Pot 
pogroms in Cambodia, the Holocaust and the Srebrenica massacres are but a few of the episodes 
that shocked the world’s conscience. Unfortunately, very little was done to save defenseless 
civilians from a well armed and determined foe until it was too late. In response to the seeming 
indifference of the international community in the face of such mass atrocities, a new concept 
emerged, that of the “Responsibility to Protect.”  
This chapter discuses this concept and the factors that led to its emergence and codification. It 
also argues that the “Responsibility to Protect” was the basis for ECOWAS’ involvement in the 
Sierra Leonean conflict. This is done by tracing the antecedent to the theory, the relevant events 
preceding and leading up to the codification of the concept in its current form, and establishing a 
link between the concept and ECOWAS’ Sierra Leonean mission.  
 
 
3.2 History of Responsibility to Protect 
The history of the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” (or R2P) began in the seventeenth 
century, when the treaty of the Peace of Westphalia established the foundations of the modern 
geo-political state. The treaty formally defined the legal characteristics of a state. They include 
territory, authority, population and above all, the concept of sovereignty which gave it the 
unfettered rights to self-government, non-intervention and freedom from interference in its 
19 
 
internal affairs.
47
 It ensured that the nation states of Europe dealt with each other as equals, under 
rules that were already determined and codified. The rules were meant to put an end to Europe’s 
history of bloody wars and establish a semblance of civility on the continent.  
However, the intervening 400 years saw a “…long and unhappy litany of…massacres and other 
atrocity crimes…,”48 despite, or maybe because of the institutionalized concept of non 
intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. These include Turkish killing of over a 
million Armenians in 1916, Stalin’s purges in the Soviet Union and the decimation of the 
Chinese population by Mao Zedong’s communists . This is not say that massacres did not exist 
before these current examples. The idea is that the concepts espoused in the Treaty do not appear 
to have had any impact on humanity’s desire to curb the excesses of war. 
There were early challenges to the unrestricted rights of sovereignty in defense of populations at 
risk. In 1884, the first Geneva Convention “… explicitly obliged states to give certain protection 
to citizens of other states in times of war.”49 Two decades later, the Congress of Berlin in 1884 
enjoined the major powers at the time to “…watch over the preservation of native tribes and to 
care for their improvement…”50  One year later, the Vienna Final Act which ended the 
Napoleonic Wars “…offered protection in some contexts, for political and national minority 
rights.”51  
After World War I, the League of Nations also mandated a system of trusteeship for colonial 
peoples, directly institutionalizing their development and welfare, and addressing the needs of 
refugees.
52
 The end of World War II brought to the fore the need for some kind of rigorous and 
formal international regime for the prevention of the type of mass atrocity crimes the world had 
just witnessed. The UN Charter of 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, both in 1948 were steps in this 
direction. They imposed on the international community the obligation to intervene in situations 
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of appalling human rights violations.  It should be noted that there were serious reservations 
about this “right” especially from certain entities in the global south who saw it as a form of neo-
colonialism by other means.  
The real breakthrough in terms of strengthening the obligation to intervene came in 2001 when 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced to the 
debate the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” which described the obligation of states to 
prevent and respond to these human rights catastrophes…’53, with the understanding that 
sovereignty also means responsibility.
54
 The UN formally endorsed “R2P” at the World Summit 
in 2005. It  proclaimed that, “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’55 If a 
state is unable or unwilling to do so, then it gives the international community the right to take 
action. As the UN stated: 
“we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”56 
 
3.3 Responsibility to Protect 
In discussing the concept of “Responsibility to Protect,” this thesis relies heavily on the ICISS 
report as it is the most coherent and authoritative pronouncement on the subject to date. As has 
been previously suggested, the international community’s inability or unwillingness to intervene 
when mass atrocity crimes were being committed was due in part, to respect for the  sovereignty 
principle . However, a series of catastrophic humanitarian events demanded that the international 
community take action to stop the recurring carnage or risk lawlessness and the loss of 
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legitimacy for international institutions. In 2000, the former Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, Kofi Annan posed a very pointed question to the General Assembly, as quoted in the 
ICISS report.  He asked:  
‘…if humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and systemic violations of human rights that affect 
every precepts of our common humanity?’57 
The question highlighted two especially brutal instances of international inertia when bold and 
decisive global leadership could have made a world of difference. The novelty in Kofi Annan’s 
declaration  was not the call for humanitarian protection of civilians suffering mass atrocities but 
rather the demand for new ways to address the ‘how’, the “when” and the ‘who’ of the issue of 
intervention; the need to lay down core principles that would serve as markers for policy makers.  
The concept of “Responsibility to Protect,” at least in theory, attempts to address some of the 
issues raised by Kofi Annan, and by implication, the broader issue of the protection of civilians 
in mass atrocity situations. Its tenets rests on two basic assumptions. First, sovereignty, far from 
being an insular protection for state impunity, entails a corresponding responsibility to protect 
citizens of every polity. Second, in the event a state is unable or unwilling to protect its own 
citizens from actual or perceived threats, the international community, under the auspices of the 
UN, should have the obligation to intervene in order to protect.
58
 
According to the ICISS, the principles of “R2P” rest on the following foundations:                                                                        
 The obligations inherent in the concept of state sovereignty 
 The maintenance of international peace and security is the responsibility of the Security 
Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter 
 The specific and binding nature of legal obligations under human rights and human 
protection declarations, covenant and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law 
 The developing practices of state, regional organizations and the Security Council itself.59 
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The concept itself has three basic elements. It starts with the notion of responsibility to prevent. 
This means that long before a given set of circumstances escalate and turns into a humanitarian 
crisis, steps must be taken to redress existing imbalances at the grassroots level. The onus of 
responsibility here falls on the individual sovereign entity, although “…support from the 
international community is often needed”60, as “…failure of prevention can have wide 
international consequences and costs.”61 
If this fails, then the international community has a “…responsibility to react to situations of 
compelling need for human protection.”62 At this point, there must be clear evidence of looming 
or unfolding catastrophe and the entity in question must demonstrate inability or lack of desire to 
resolve the situation. In that case, it behooves the larger community to “…institute appropriate 
measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, 
and in extreme cases, military intervention,”63 to address the situation. For there to be a prima 
facie case for military intervention, it must satisfy the following criteria: right authority, just 
cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.
64
 More will be 
said about this in the next chapter.  
The post-intervention responsibility to rebuild is predicated, for the most part, although not 
exclusively, on the idea that some kind of intervention, usually military, might have taken place. 
The subsequent adverse toll on human and material resources imposes a corresponding 
requirement of “…full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the 
causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.”65 This involves both the 
international community and local stakeholders working together. Post conflict attempts at 
reconciliation which forms part of the process of rebuilding, are “…best generated by ground 
level reconstruction efforts, when former adversaries join hands in rebuilding their community or 
creating reasonable living and job conditions…”66 These efforts may be underwritten by the 
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international community in the form of the UN or regional organizations like ECOWAS and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC.) 
Although ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone without necessarily basing its actions on the 
“Responsibility to Protect” principle, this analysis uses ICISS’ six criteria for justifying military 
intervention under the concept of R2P as a framework to evaluate the mission. This is the goal of 
the next chapter. Other aspects of the theory are used as explanatory tools to establish necessary 
context.   
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CHAPTER 4 
JUSTIFICATION OF ECOWAS’ INTERVENTION IN SIERRA LEONE 
4.1 Introduction 
The conflict in Sierra Leone started in 1991 and officially ended in 2002. At the beginning, it did 
not feature very much on the international radar because West Africa was never seriously 
considered as a geopolitically important outpost in strategic terms. It became headline news only 
because the regional organization ECOWAS, having transformed itself from an institution 
primarily dedicated to regional economic integration into a security organization, intervened 
militarily in the conflict. Although this followed closely on the heels of the Liberian situation,
67
 
the two were underscored by completely different theoretical considerations. When ECOWAS 
decided to intervene in Sierra Leone, it did so without the benefit of precedence in that no 
civilian government had ever been reinstated through the collective will of a regional entity on 
the continent,  and so much of what unfolded as a result could at best be described as patchwork 
of ad hoc measures and glorified improvisations.  
This chapter aims to critically analyze ECOWAS’ efforts, both military and civilian, in Sierra 
Leone with a view to justifying its participation within the context of its own rules and regulation 
and also within international laws and customs based on the concept of “ Responsibility To 
Protect.” It is important to point out that the chapter and indeed the thesis  as a whole does not 
seek to establish the precise success or failure of the mission. It means that the thesis does not 
indulge in the aesthetics of failure or success in any context. What it does is justify the idea that 
ECOWAS’ intervention was the appropriate thing to do, within pre-determined parameters of the 
organization’s own protocols and those of other international organizations such as the UN and 
the African Union (AU.)  
Much of what follows is based on ECOWAS’ own charter. However, every member of this 
regional organization is also a member of the African Union and the United Nations. As a result, 
the rules and regulations of these other organizations are mentioned in so far as they relate to the 
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issues. Accordingly, the argument is professed that ECOWAS, acting as a regional security 
organization, was justified in intervening in Sierra Leone first under its own laws and protocols, 
and also under international law’s statutes and conventions and  under the  burgeoning concept 
of “Responsibility to Protect.” Despite the fact that participating ECOMOG troops came from 
countries that, at the time, could not be remotely construed as democratic in any real sense of the 
word, the conclusion is drawn, based on the evidence, that there is enough reason to hold out this 
singular political/military event as a wholesome template worthy of replication elsewhere in the 
world. But first, a brief historical overview of the country and its descent into chaos. 
 
 
4.2 Brief History of Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone got its name from the Portuguese term for “Lion Mountain.” The local population is 
made up of descendants of British slaves, mostly black refugees of the American War of 
Independence shipped in from Nova Scotia, and local indigenous groups. It became a 
protectorate of the British crown in 1896 and gained independence in 1961. A succession of 
military coups culminating in Siaka Stevens’ assumption of power in 1968 marked a turning 
point in the fortunes of the newly independent state. Stevens turned the country into a de jure one 
party authoritarian state, complete with an Internal Security Unit which was “…a 
brutal...personally managed paramilitary force made up of young men recruited from the slums 
of Freetown.”68 Its sole purpose was to muzzle political dissent.  It has been argued that Stevens 
derived his legitimacy from a system of governance rooted in patrimony and ethnicity.
69
 He 
developed a network of supporters based solely on tribal affiliations  and turned the state’s most 
profitable industry, the diamond industry, into a criminal enterprise for the benefit of himself and 
his supporters. His regime has been described variously as a  “…kleptocracy… a combination of 
guile, flattery, bribery and intimidation.”70  Steven’s  handpicked successor Gen. Momoh, 
inherited a state that had been so undermined that its very existence as a viable political entity 
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was a questionable proposition. Disaffected youth joined the radical Foday Sankoh, “…a 
functional illiterate who became part of the revolutionary cell”71 in the mining areas of Kono. He 
later become founder and leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and with considerable 
external support, he started a rebellion. To add to the confusion, the sitting president, Momoh 
was toppled by a bunch of disgruntled junior officers. They turned to South African and other 
mercenary groups to help stem the tide of a war that was going badly for it. Elections were held 
in 1996 and a civilian government under Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, was sworn in and a peace 
agreement with the rebels was put in place. 
In 1997, a group of soldiers again took over the government, forcing the civilian leader into exile 
and forging an alliance with RUF rebels. They, in turn, were forced out of power by ECOWAS 
and the civilian administration restored. However, the RUF continued a violent campaign in the 
countryside. In the words of Amnesty International, “Since their removal from power, the AFRC 
(Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) and the RUF have wreaked a campaign of terror against 
unarmed civilians…several thousand civilians have been brutally killed or mutilated.”72 
ECOMOG managed to stabilize the security situation through a series of intense engagements 
with the rebels before handing over control of the country to the UN.  
4.3 Significance of ECOWAS’ Protocols  
In the following session, ECOWAS protocols that provide the rationale for intervention are 
discussed. These are situated within the larger context of more global principles of sovereignty 
and intervention, such as those based on the UN Charter. Article 2:1 of the UN’s Charter 
declares that “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.”73 Article 2:4 imposes a duty on all members to “…refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”74  
Together, they form the seminal basis of international law’s prohibition on intervention in the 
                                                          
71
 Pratt 10 
72
 Pratt 14 
73
 United Nations. “The United Nations Charter,” http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml, accessed 
on 10/10/11  
74
 United Nations. The United Nations Charter,” http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml, accessed 
on 10/10/11 
27 
 
internal affairs of sovereign nation states. As discussed elsewhere, the UN’s formulations on 
state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries has its 
antecedents in the Westphalian concept of  sovereignty which defines the nation state in terms of 
its legal identity under international law. However, this bears repetition because much of the 
criticism directed at ECOWAS were couched in terms of international law’s prohibition on 
breach of state sovereignty.   
It is not entirely certain if ECOWAS’ intervention in Sierra Leone constitute such a breach. That 
is an issue for legal scholars. The important issue here is the fact that ECOWAS’ protocols on 
security were unequivocal in intent and wording. As a founding member and party to the 
succession of security instruments enacted over the years by ECOWAS, Sierra Leone along with 
the rest of the signatories, consciously acknowledge the existence of security challenges that the 
various instruments were designed to address. This, however, is not necessarily evidence that 
member countries of this regional bloc have agreed to a diminution of their sovereignty, but it is 
circumstantially evident that they are bound by the rules of this organization to which they 
belong. This is especially true given the fact that West Africans have always been painfully 
aware of the existence of a security vacuum in the region
75
 and that in the event of crisis such as 
the ones in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Protocols were going to form the basis upon which any 
attempt at resolution would be based. 
The absolute need for security in West Africa was an overriding concern for the regional 
leadership. West Africa was either going to float or sink together as a unit. Kaplan fingered 
demographic explosion as the main reason for the “coming anarchy” in the region. In his view, 
West Africa was facing a “…withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and 
regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease and the growing pervasiveness of war…And 
West Africa’s future, eventually will also be that of most of the world”.76 The population 
explosion he talks about will inevitably lead to conflict over scarce resources. The resulting 
societal breakdown could engulf the rest of the world.
77
 This provides a general background to 
some of the issues confronting the region at the time. Security in one form or the other, was 
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paramount, and West Africa was going to do something about it. The protocols, especially those 
dealing with security can be seen as West Africa’s considered response to this issue.   
 As has been stated previously, ECOWAS was created in 1975 primarily as an economic 
grouping. Along the way, it metamorphosed into a security bloc. The two most important 
enabling security instruments are the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and before that the Protocol 
on Non-Aggression in 1978. The necessity for these protocols were many. They include the 
recurring incidents of  foreign inspired coups d’etat which put most of the region’s regimes 
under all kinds of stress. There were no longer any “big brother” institutions to fall back on since 
the end of the Cold War had changed the narrative and the dynamics of state security in the 
developing world.  Superpowers were no longer interested in guaranteeing the security of client 
states and so a deliberate choice was made to set up collective security structures. The question 
therefore was to determine how these Protocols shaped the security environment in such a way 
as to make the Sierra Leonean intervention possible. 
4.4 The Pre-1999 Protocols 
The post colonial landscape in West Africa was dogged by ideological conflicts with various 
client states fronting for their paymasters. Security was measured in terms of one’s usefulness to 
one superpower or the other. However, violent border clashes between some states in the region 
drove home the point that security arrangements as then constituted did not adequately meet  
expectations. Francophone states for instance realized that defense links with France could not 
necessarily deter all forms of local threats.
78
 As a practical matter therefore, they decided that 
their common challenges were better dealt with by the collective based on the common need for 
mutual non-aggression and the desire for assistance in the event of external aggression. 
The original ECOWAS treaty contained no provision for mutual defense. The West African 
francophone innovation then known as “CEAO” was perhaps the needed inspiration. 
“Increasingly aware that it could not attain its (economic) objectives save in an atmosphere of 
peace,”79 “a Protocol on Non-aggression intended to create a friendly atmosphere, free of any 
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fear of attack or aggression of one state by another,”80 just may help secure the kind of 
conditions that were needed at the time. Consequently, a new security paradigm started to take 
shape alongside original plans for economic integration. It took the form of a linkage between 
security and economic development, but the fine print was still sketchy. A treaty of non-
aggression could inspire confidence and goodwill among signatories, but on its own, it was 
insufficient to curb external threats and internal insurrections supported from the outside. On the 
whole, security challenges were not limited to any particular set of adversaries or circumstances. 
They existed everywhere and, steps had to be taken to deal with these challenges if the other 
variable of the equation, ie economic development, was to be realized. 
This theme of “no development without security”81 continued to dominate the headlines in 
subsequent ECOWAS gatherings. Former Heads of State Eyadema of Togo and Senghor of 
Senegal took the lead in advocating a stronger role for ECOWAS in the defense of the region. It 
is important to point out that the strongest advocates of regional security integration were some 
of the same countries who had significant military links to France. This cognitively dissonant 
arrangement can perhaps be explained by the idea that instinctively , they realized that their 
destinies lie within the collective efforts of the regional grouping, while at the same time 
retaining the support of France just in case local collective efforts do not pan out. The successor 
to the Non-Aggression treaty signed in 1981, it must be stressed,  was the first to make provision 
for the establishment of a force to be made up of units from ECOWAS armies, and spelt out in 
elaborate terms when and how it could be deployed. This, according to some observers, 
“provided the basis for the highly successful intervention of the Community’s Ceasefire 
Monitoring Group”82 in Liberia and also set the stage, one might add, for its deployment to 
Sierra Leone years later. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 THE INTERVENTION 
Given what is now known about ECOWAS’ handling of the Sierra Leone conflict, this aspect of 
the thesis focuses mainly on the second tenet of the doctrine of R2P, the Responsibility to React. 
ECOWAS obviously had the responsibility to prevent , to react and to rebuild, but the decision to 
focus on the responsibility to react is based on hindsight. The fact they had to intervene militarily 
pre-supposes that they failed in their responsibility to prevent for one reason or the other. On the 
other side of the divide, the responsibility to rebuild was taken out of ECOWAS’ hands by the 
UN when it assumed control of the situation soon after the intervention. The first and the last 
“responsibilities” are therefore touched on only as explanatory tools to buttress the idea that 
although there are seeming inadequacies and contradictions in the way the whole episode 
unfolded, ECOWAS’ decision to react and the manner in which it was done were justifiable. 
In discussing the “Responsibility to Protect”, certain legitimate questions arise. Is R2P the 
prescriptive solution for humanitarian crises across board? Is it feasible, indeed practical for the 
international community to react in the same way every time there is a humanitarian crisis? A 
Chinese professor once quipped that China had used tanks to kill people in Tiananmen Square. It 
is Myanmar’s sovereign right to kill their own people too.83 This is a pointed reference to the 
international community’s apparently inconsistent stance regarding state abuse of citizens’ 
human rights in both countries. It is the position of this paper that the perfect cannot be the 
enemy of the good, and that as much as it is desirable to have the international community act 
with consistency in comparable situations across the board, the reality is that this is not always 
possible. The normative expectations of consistency notwithstanding, the international 
community has the responsibility to act in cases of humanitarian crisis wherever and whenever 
possible. Not to do so would amount to entrenching idealism over practical policy, and the 
consequences are not difficult to imagine.
84
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Responsibility To Prevent  
In relative terms, the Sierra Leonean rebellion was one of the most destructive the world has ever 
seen. Foday Sankoh’s bush war started in 1991, and pitted the RUF against three successive 
governments and within the context of three decades of state disintegration.
85
 The question is, 
what were the grievances of the RUF and what could the regional authority have done, if 
anything, to prevent the Sierra Leonean state from going over the abyss?  
It is generally accepted that Stevens’ Prebendal rule was the root cause of Sierra Leone’s rebel 
war.
86
 It was characterized by such acts as closing the “national railway on economic grounds,”87 
“violence and vote rigging”88 and instituting “criminal anarchy”89 in the conduct of the diamond 
trade, the country’s most important natural resource. His security apparatus was essentially a 
gangster organization, recruited from among unemployed youths in Freetown slums. Once 
recruited, they are fed hard drugs and let loose on the opposition as part of the regime’s political 
strategy. The result was a growing army of unemployed, disillusioned, drug addicted youth 
acculturated to violence, who would later constitute the recruitment base of the rebellion.
90
 In the 
political economy of the sub-region, this type of behavior was what passed for political 
governance and in Sierra Leone it resulted in the competitive and uncoordinated looting of the 
state and its resources by party functionaries and their collaborators.
91
 
Looting of state resources came in different forms. Resource predation in the form of alluvial 
diamond mining was a leitmotif in the pre-war Sierra Leonean narrative. Aside of the fact that 
Stevens was directly implicated in the looting of diamonds
92
, he also abolished the state agency 
responsible for the corporate mining of the mineral, ushering in an era of chaotic free for all 
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mining, resulting in a dramatic plunge in official diamond exports.
93
 Not surprisingly, when this  
coupled with the general lethargy in the country’s economic performance at this time, and when 
it combined with the removal of subsidies and tax hikes, the general population came under 
enormous economic strain.  
Aside of all this, there was the feeling of rural isolation. The gulf in the living standards between 
the ruling Freetown elite and the rest of the country was largely responsible for this perception. 
Stevens drew much of his support from Freetown and so felt free to marginalize the rural 
population.
94
 Society’s fissures were not limited to the urban/rural divide. Ethnic tensions were  
just as pronounced. They were epitomized by the serious cleavage between the Mende 
dominated Southern and Eastern Provinces and the Temne dominated Northern Provinces.
95
 
Stevens mined the divide politically, making full use of the near total illiteracy of the rural 
dwellers to entrench his brutal rule and push the state ever closer to the precipice. 
Although Stevens’, and by extension the great majority of Sierra Leone’s post colonial 
leadership’s culpability in running the state into the ground is not in dispute, the cause of the war 
is. There is a significant minority, such as the country’s former ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim 
Camara, who believes the war started and ended with alluvial diamonds. He stated: 
We have always maintained that the conflict in Sierra Leone  was not about ideology, tribal or 
regional differences. It had nothing to do with so called marginalized youth, or as some political 
commentators have characterized it, an uprising by the rural poor against the urban elite. The 
root of the conflict is diamonds, diamonds and diamonds.
96
 
Either way, what were ECOWAS’ options under the Responsibility to Prevent concept which 
stresses that “…prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to 
protect.”97  We start from the assumption that “African States are inextricably locked into 
security complexes,”98 and that the “dynamics of regionalization of domestic civil wars”99 is an 
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all too common phenomenon in West Africa. Given this realization and the bitter experiences of 
its efforts in Liberia, it was expected that ECOWAS was going to “do something” about a 
nascent security threat like the one then unfolding in Sierra Leone, in the light of all the warning 
signs enumerated above. However, prevention of deadly conflict “…is first and foremost the 
responsibility of sovereign states.”100 The onus was therefore on the government in Freetown to 
make every effort to ensure accountability, good governance, protection of human rights, 
promotion of social and economic development and fair distribution of resources.
101
  
The government was unable or unwilling to live up to its responsibilities for a variety of reasons. 
The political and economic fortunes of the Sierra Leonean state at the time were bleak indeed. It 
is believed that “…by the mid 1980s, the country was descending into insolvency. Growing 
foreign debt…budget deficit, corruption and declining exports led to chronic fuel, power and 
food shortages.”102 The ability to guarantee the security and safety of citizens became a very 
tenuous proposition for the government as a result. But conflict prevention is not merely a 
national or local affair, as it has international ramifications. The international community’s 
involvement may include support for good governance, promotion of the rule of law and efforts 
at mediation and conciliation,
103
 and in this instance, maybe even pressure on the government to 
reform. 
For the international community to act in a meaningful and timely manner to prevent conflict, the 
action  must have three essential components.  First, “…there must be knowledge of the fragility 
of the situation and the risks associated with it… Second, there must be understanding of policy 
measures available capable of making a difference.”104 Third and most important, it requires the 
availability, not just in theory but also in practice, of capability to deliver appropriate responses 
and the necessary political will to apply those resources.
105
 The remaining question here is: How 
does ECOWAS’ response measure up to these standards?  
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Knowledge of the situation necessarily involves some form of early warning system capabilities, 
which is defined as “…any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or 
formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing”.106 In West 
Africa, the prototype of any kind of early warning system was not put in place until 1999  
expressly to “…detect, monitor and analyze signs of threat or breakdowns in relation within or 
between member states…107  That puts the establishment of this mechanism well after the fact. In 
the absence of a formal system of risk assessment, the organization had very limited alternative 
means of gathering and disseminating information on risks and threats to security in the region. 
This lack of capability is due to the fact that West Africa is one of the most economically and 
technologically depressed regions of the world. In the run up to war, ECOWAS’ collective 
economic balance sheet was not very inspiring. All of its members were “…principally primary 
producers, who depend on a small number of agricultural and mineral products for the bulk of 
their income…per capita incomes are very low…[and they] depended heavily on the advanced 
industrialized countries for trade capital, technology and skills…”108 Infrastructure development 
of the type that would make any kind of relevant data collection feasible was at best rudimentary. 
Thus access to data for the kind of action that is mandated was clearly a tall order for the 
regional body. To compound the problems, West Africa  had just recently extricated itself from 
another very expensive peace enforcement mission in neighboring Liberia, and thus resources 
were at a premium. It was therefore not practically feasible to expect ECOWAS to necessarily 
possess the kind of capability that would prepare it for every potential conflict situation, 
especially in a region where such situations are as a rule, commonplace. 
Also, was there a concise understanding of available measures that could have, if taken, made a 
real difference in the outcome of events? Following on the previous point, the obvious answer is 
no. It has already been determined that ECOWAS did not have the capacity at the time to gather 
relevant data, and so probably had very little idea about what was going on in Sierra Leone. If 
they knew anything at all, it is not exactly clear the extent and the relevance of the knowledge. 
But the crux of the matter which is not often articulated, was the real probability that ECOWAS 
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at the time was a house divided
109
. At least two of its members were complicit in the planning 
and execution of the rebellion, based on “…clear evidence that Liberia and Burkina Faso [were] 
supporting the rebels.”110 Could this be a case of see no evil and hear no evil? 
A third interesting and important question  arises out of the previous two. Did ECOWAS have 
the political will to deliver the appropriate response if it had all the necessary information? Let us 
consider the empirical evidence from the inception of the organization in 1975 to the outbreak of 
the civil war in Sierra Leone in 1991. Despite the hopes and expectations, and the pomp and 
pageantry that accompanied its inception as a regional organization, ECOWAS  remained 
dormant for over a year and a half after the ratification of its treaty.
111
 Somehow it appears as if 
the signatories believed the document would become self executing by the mere act of their 
signing it. This attitude is played out in the “…generally low commitment to implement the 
decision and agreements collectively made at the highest political levels of ECOWAS.”112 Up 
until now, only one protocol (Protocol on the free movement of persons) had become operational 
due to apathy and self serving excuses of “national interests.” It is not a novelty to see sovereign 
members of other international organizations put their parochial national interests above that of 
the collective; however, ECOWAS’ track record in this regard imply something deeper and 
provide more complex challenges than mere questions of national interest. 
National interest concerns notwithstanding, there were also institutional deficiencies that plagued 
the organization. The first had to do with the structure of decision making. The  requirement that 
“…all members must agree before decisions are made which affect the community as a 
whole,”113 guarantees that very little ever gets done. Obtaining absolute consensus in an 
organization of  such stature and complexity is a difficult proposition at the best of times. 
Consequently, even if West Africa was motivated enough to want to do something about an 
impending catastrophe in Sierra Leone, an institutional framework of rules and regulations that 
gave a virtual veto power to every single member, is a recipe for gridlock. This is especially so in 
this case where two of the member states were key rebel allies.  
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A second institutional deficiency that hindered ECOWAS’ ability to act  decisively was The 
Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense signed in 1981. It was meant as a collective 
framework on regional defense, but it was more of a paper tiger than anything else. During the 
1980s, there were at least three opportunities offered to ECOWAS to demonstrate its 
commitment to collective security as stated in the protocol. First, it was the Mali-Burkina Faso 
frontier mini war in December, 1985.
114
 This was the outgrowth of a twenty-five year old dispute 
over mineral rich Agacher border zone.
115
 Second was the very serious issue of the attempted 
overthrow of the Togolese government with the apparent complicity (strongly denied) by the 
Ghanaian and Burkinabe governments in 1986. Third was the 1989 diplomatic flare up between 
Senegal and Mauretania primarily about border demarcation, but also concerning the large 
number of immigrant citizens of both countries in each other’s territory.116  
On each occasion, the dispute and the resolution process played out outside the framework of 
ECOWAS and its institutions. “In all three cases, opportunities were missed, as the conflicts 
were managed and controlled by governments and institutions outside the ECOWAS defense 
pact”117 because the document simply was not equipped to adequately deal with these kinds of 
issues. Alternatively, it could be seen as complete lack of political will at the highest levels of 
decision making in the organization. It is therefore evident that ECOWAS’ track record of 
garnering the political will to act when it matters, was not very inspiring. 
 
Responsibility To React        
The second dimension of the R2P doctrine is the Responsibility to React. This implies “…above 
all else the responsibility to react to situations of compelling need for human protection.”118 In 
the absence or failure of prevention, the onus shifts back onto the international community to 
step in and stop human suffering either because the state is unwilling or unable to protect its own 
citizens. These may include coercive steps such as “…political, economic and judicial measures, 
                                                          
114
 Okolo 41 
115
 Okolo 41 
116
 Okolo 41 
117
 Okolo 41 
118
 ICISS 29 
37 
 
and in extreme cases, but only in extreme cases, they may also include military action.”119 The 
test here is to determine whether the situation in Sierra Leone constituted an “extreme case” for 
which ECOWAS military intervention was justified. To answer this question, it is important to 
establish the relevant facts of the case. 
Throughout its post independence history, Sierra Leone has not been anything other than a weak 
state held together by the arm of a strong man dictator at one time or the other. It easily fits “the 
definition of a failed state by virtue of its declining ability to provide order and security, much 
less social services.”120 Politicians intentionally destroyed the capacity of the state to function  as 
a viable political entity. They used violence and insecurity instead of  bureaucratic state 
institutions to control the people.
121
 There was really “…very little distinction between corrupt 
officials and armed gangs”122, which effectively meant that the state had ceased to exist in all but 
name. Government revenue averaged only 10 million dollars (US) a year after 1991 compared to 
250 million annually in the mid 70s.
123
 Although debt servicing and Structural Adjustment 
Programs were partially responsible for this state of affairs, most of it was due to criminal 
mismanagement of the state. It has been suggested that, government control extended as far as 
the edge of Freetown, the capital city.
124
 There were other signs of decay also. “Television ended 
in 1987 when the Minister of Information sold the transmitter to a “Kuwaiti investor”. Radio 
disappeared 1987 when the broadcasting antenna fell over.”125 However dire the situation, this 
was by no means unique. Remove the term “Sierra Leone” and what is left could just as easily be 
descriptive of the situation in at least a dozen other African countries at the time. So why was 
Sierra Leone an “extreme case”?  
The extreme case scenario becomes apparent when we look a little more closely at the goings on 
at the time. On or about the time of the insurgency (probably earlier), the whole state apparatus 
was barely functioning. The Sierra Leonean armed forces, whose job it was to defend the state 
from the kind of rebel insurgency that was plaguing the country were so weak and ineffective, 
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the state had to resort to the use of foreign mercenaries as forces of law and order. The 
government brought in Executive Outcomes (EO), the South African private security outfit, as 
well as Frontline Security Services (FSS), its British counterpart and Gurkha Security Guards 
Ltd.
126
 They were hired not only to fight the rebels but also maintain internal security. This state 
of affairs cannot seriously be contemplated as part of the political narrative in any self respecting 
contemporary political entity. In exchange for buying short term security gains, this sort of 
arrangement required the state to mortgage crucially needed national resources,
127
 by signing 
away future earnings from alluvial diamonds deposit as payment. This further impoverished the 
state and fuelled the cycle of instability, forcing desperate civilians to flee to neighboring  
countries. 
Another reason Sierra Leone represented an “extreme case” was the possibility it could draw the 
whole region, or at least a good number of regional states, into the conflict. It is suggested that  
“…the Sierra Leone conflict is inextricably linked to the security of the entire sub-region…any 
actions taken with respect to the conflict in Sierra Leone will inevitably have a significant impact 
on the security situation in and policies of Guinea, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana 
and Nigeria.”128 Former Liberian leader Charles Taylor’s major role in promoting the failure of 
public order in Sierra Leone
129
 bears testimony to this.  There was also outside military 
involvement as well. The evidence indicated that “…small arms are coming from Eastern Europe 
through Libya [and Burkina Faso and Liberia]… to the rebels.’130 Other states in the region with 
very little resources of their own, were bursting at the seams with the inflow of refugees fleeing 
the conflict in Sierra Leone. It was shaping up to be West Africa’s “Great War.” Looking at the 
bigger picture, this was the last thing the region needed, an all encompassing war that would 
drain badly needed resources away from the individual states. 
If this conflict should spread, it was going to suck in Nigeria, which alone comprises 60% of the 
region’s entire population.  Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and Guinea sit on one side of the political 
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divide in opposition to the Liberia/Burkina Faso axis. They (Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Mali) 
actually provided all of the ECOMOG troops for the war effort. The ECOMOG force 
commander’s threat to “…launch air strikes into Liberia and Burkina Faso if the flow of small 
arms into Sierra Leone through those two nations is not curbed immediately,”131 served as a grim 
reminder of the potential of this conflict to escalate. Nigeria, along with these other countries 
easily represent close to ¾ of the population of the region. 
Perhaps the most credible “extreme case” scenario existing in Sierra Leone at the time was the 
activities of the RUF. Founded in 1988, it was fundamentally a guerilla army, “…a bandit 
organization solely driven by the survivalist needs of its predominantly uneducated and alienated 
battlefront and battle group commanders.”132 It employed terror and mutilations as weapons of 
war and uses women and children as human shields. A large number of its members were 
children forcibly recruited and brutalized. 
They burned entire villages, “…beheading chiefs, and amputating civilians in front of 
communities in order to force people to flee.”133 This scorched earth tactics left vast swathes of 
the Sierra Leonean countryside depopulated. An estimated 53 percent of women in areas under 
their control were raped and 4000 people have had their limbs amputated.
134
 Here’s a sampling 
of news reports about the activities of the RUF between 1994 and 1997: 
 26th December, 1994: At least 25 people died over Christmas in a series of attacks which 
the military blamed on the RUF. Military sources in Kenema said rebels attacked the outskirts of 
the town on Sunday, killing five people and shattering the three week old ceasefire.
135
  
 16th January, 1995: RUF rebels raided the campus of Njala University College on 
Sunday, killing 7 civilians and looting a food store…rebels identified themselves as members of 
the RUF.
136
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 31st January, 1995: An estimated 24,000 Sierra Leonean refugees have fled to Guinea 
since the RUF attack on Kambia a week ago, the UNHCR said Tuesday… the refugees reported 
that the RUF killed at least 9 civilians and burned a number of homes during the attack.
137
  
 16th April, 1995: An RUF military tribunal will put on trial foreign soldiers captured in 
battles with the army and could be executed by firing squad, an RUF spokesman said on 
Wednesday… ‘the maximum sentence will be the death penalty, they will be executed the 
military way,’138 the spokesman added.  
 25th October,  1996: The UN World Food Programme reported Friday it had found 
hundreds of people who looked like “living Skeletons” after being held by the RUF for as long 
as five years... young men and women, besides being very thin, had swollen feet and sores… 
children had bloated stomachs, scabies and discolored hair because of malnutrition.
139
 
These were not accidental acts committed in the heat of battle. These were all well thought out 
and well orchestrated war crimes. They took some sort of perverse pride in inflicting pain and 
suffering on fellow country folks, using fear as a tool to suck support away from the central 
government in Freetown. Within the period under review, they agreed and then reneged on a 
commitment to adhere to cease fire on at least six different occasions. On 7
th
 December, 1994, 
they rebuffed overtures from the government for peace talks, and repeated it again on the 6
th
 and 
12
th
 of January, 1995. On April the 27
th
, the government again offered to meet the rebels and 
they responded by renewing their military offensive. It took three tries in Cote d’Ivoire in 1996 
(ie 23
rd
 April, 24
th
 October, 30
th
 November) to get a Peace Agreement.
140
 On each occasion, they 
hid behind spurious claims about the nationality of the lead negotiator who was backed by the 
international community, or the composition of the government’s negotiating team. In the 
meantime, hundreds of innocent civilians were being massacred daily (see news dispatch 
excerpts above), mostly by RUF fighters. It is difficult to understand what motivates people 
these. 
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By January the 25
th
, 1997, the government was accusing the rebels of “…delaying the peace 
process by refusing to nominate members for a joint monitoring group and demobilization 
commission.”141 An RUF spokesman in turn accused the government of breaking the Abidjan 
ceasefire deal. Their decision to delay the peace process was attributed to the fact that the leader 
of the group did not want to deal with the United Nations envoy to Sierra Leone, Berhanu Dinka. 
He (Mr. Dinka), the group alleged, has been “ …very, very biased. He has no respect for our 
leader nor the RUF high Command. He is always on the side of the Government.”142 Earlier, on 
the 3
rd
 of January 1997, Sankoh stormed out of a meeting with the UN Mission in Abidjan, 
“…objecting to the presence of UN envoy Berhanu Dinka”143 for the same reasons given above. 
Conduct like this can only reinforce an already poor public perception of a movement that lacked 
any ideological conviction and broad popular support.
144
  
RUF’s well documented atrocities were a problem for the international community that was 
trying to bring an end to the violence. This problem was compounded when they found 
themselves suddenly confronted by a new government made up of renegade soldiers and the 
RUF.  In confirmation of those fears, the incoming junta  made no pretense at democratic 
governance at all. They just looted private property and terrorized the civilian population. The 
international community unanimously condemned this latest round of outrage and demanded the 
junta hand over power back to the deposed former civilian administration through negotiations. 
The rebels (not the coup leaders) rejected mediation. This, and other events, suggests they were 
the ones in control. The rebel spokesman was quoted as saying they were “…ready to fight to the 
end and are prepared for anything.”145 This was a few short weeks after signing the Abidjan 
Accord aimed at ending the war. It seriously undermined any pretensions to good faith that the 
rebels may have claimed from the outset. On the 28
th
 May, 1997, “The RUF High 
Command…ordered its fighters to back the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council…Field 
commanders were instructed that their orders from Sankoh will now come through Major Johnny 
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Paul Koroma, the leader of the AFRC.”146 This was indication that the AFRC and the RUF have 
become one and the same, a whole that was bent on going to any length to thwart the 
international community’s efforts  to halt the violence and re-establish the authority of the state.   
 
5:2 The ECOWAS Invasion-Responsibility To React  
As has been stated elsewhere, the Responsibility to Protect “…implies above all else a 
responsibility to react to situations of compelling need for human protection.”147 It has been 
established up to this point that the situation in Sierra Leone was simply untenable. The authority 
of the state to run the affairs of the country barely existed. It was incapable of offering even the 
minimum level of protection to its citizens. This, however, does not automatically trigger the 
military intervention option. For that to happen, a high threshold of conditions must be met 
before this option even becomes defensible.   
 Up to this point, it appears ECOWAS has been a bit part player mainly because it did not have 
the institutional capacity and structures to deal with the Sierra Leonean problem. First, it had 
clearly failed in its initial efforts to implement  “…root cause or direct prevention measures to 
stave off or contain a humanitarian crisis or conflict.”148 As a result, conflict had taken a terrible 
toll on the Sierra Leonean state in terms of loss of  infrastructure, economic activity and human 
capital, and corrective measures must escalate to reflect the new level of urgency. The state, 
symbolized by the new junta in Freetown, had become the main obstacle to, instead of facilitator 
of, peace. In keeping with the graduated process of the responsibility to react, a sanctions regime 
designed “…to inhibit the state’s ability to interact with the outside world, while not physically 
preventing [it]  from carrying out actions within its borders,”149was put in place. Sanctions 
generally may take the form of military, diplomatic or economic measures. The most effective 
form of military sanction is arms embargo. It deprives the offending party of its most potent 
means of aggression. The international community could also “…end military cooperation and 
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training programmes”150 with a state as a means of enforcing compliance. Economically, 
“…financial sanctions may target the foreign assets of a country, a rebel movement or a terrorist 
organization…[putting] restrictions on income generating activities such as oil, diamonds, 
logging and drugs…and [imposing] prohibitions on international air traffic to and from a 
particular destination.”151 On the diplomatic level, “…travel restrictions could be imposed on 
specific individuals and their families…suspension of membership or expulsion from 
international or regional organizations…or refusal to admit a country to membership of a 
body.”152 
For the sanctions to work, ECOWAS reached out and coordinated its efforts with the UN. It 
adopted a two tiered approach. The first tier consisted of a massive show of force in the form of a 
dramatic increase in troop levels on the ground in Freetown, leaving the rebels/coup leaders in no 
doubt as to the intentions of the organization. The second included imposing and enforcing the 
aforementioned sanctions. As a rule, the international community is always wary of the use of 
military force as an option in the conduct of interstate relations. The situation then was no 
different. It was no secret what was going on in Sierra Leone and for how long, but the US, for 
instance, announced it would prefer a “diplomatic” solution to the problem. A State Department 
official declared:  “There has been enough violence in Sierra Leone. We hope democracy is 
quickly restored there by diplomatic means.”153 Ghana’s then acting Foreign Minister stressed 
the need for a “…negotiated political settlement which upholds the respect of the democratic 
choice of the people of Sierra Leone.”154 The Nigerian Foreign Minister reaffirmed his 
government’s support for the ousted leader and disclosed that his country was in consultation 
with other countries in the sub-region to ensure restoration of Sierra Leone’s legitimate 
government and a quick return to peace and stability.
155
 Reacting to events in Sierra Leone, the 
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US National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger stressed “I think we prefer to see this thing resolved 
through political rather than military means.”156 
Considering the reactions from the international community, consensus seemed to be building 
around a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the impasse. Pursuant to that, a Nigerian 
newspaper was said to have reported that ECOMOG was negotiating with the coup leaders to 
give up power peacefully, and the junta spokesman acknowledged that the soldiers are coming 
under heavy pressure to abandon their coup.
157
 The two track effort of carrot and stick continued 
at an ECOWAS Foreign Ministers conference in Conakry, Guinea on the 27
th
 of March, 1997. 
They “…agreed to pursue dialogue and economic sanctions to force Sierra Leone’s military 
rulers to reinstate ousted president Kabah…[while] the Nigerians reportedly began a sea 
blockade of Sierra Leone…[and] ECOWAS has called for an air blockade as well.”158 
 It was clear to most observers at the time that, after close to a decade of mindless bloodshed 
within which numerous negotiated attempts to stop it failed, the time for diplomatic niceties was 
long gone. The decision by ECOWAS to resort to economic and political sanctions as a first step 
to resolving the problem was therefore a step in the right direction. In essence, this was time for 
realpolitik. This goal of removing the illegal regime from power through peaceful means as a 
necessary pre-condition for peace was supported overwhelmingly by the international 
community in the form  of declarations of endorsement by the UN, the Commonwealth, the 
OAU and ECOWAS. However, it was difficult to see how the world was going to achieve a 
different outcome using the same negotiating tactics. 
 
5:3  Decision to intervene  
ECOWAS eventually resorted to the use of military force to dislodge the AFRC/RUF junta from 
power because diplomatic and military sanctions simply did not work, no matter what the critics 
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said. The ICISS was very clear that the decision to intervene must be taken “in extreme cases 
only.” The question to be asked therefore, are whether this was an extreme case, and whether the 
situation met the threshold for intervention within the context of the Responsibility to React.   
The point of departure is the international norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
sovereign nation states. The international system thrives or should thrive on order and 
predictability and not on the whims and moods of the strong and powerful. When it comes to 
sovereignty, none is more equal than the other. Any disruption of this order must and should be 
based strictly on parameters anchored in verifiable pre-existing norms and traditions rather than 
retroactive legislation and spur of the moment decisions. Interventions that violate the 
sovereignty principle  must be “…weighed in light of general prohibition on the use of force in 
Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter and the broader principle of non-intervention, 
recognized under customary international law.”159  The goal is to “…encourage states to solve 
their own internal problems and prevent these from spilling over into a threat to international 
peace and security.”160 There is very little question that “military action by ECOWAS 
States…fall within the scope of the prohibition on the use of force of Article 2(4), regardless of 
the purpose pursued.”161 
However, as recognized by ICISS: 
‘there are exceptional circumstances in which the very interest that all states have in 
maintaining a stable international order requires them to react when all order within a state has 
broken down or when civil conflict or repression are so violent that civilians are threatened with 
massacre, genocide and ethnic cleansing on a large scale.’162 
Based on the above quote, the argument could be made, that the action is prohibited but not 
necessarily illegal, as it could be justified under certain circumstances. This loophole in the 
interpretation of the rules enabled the Commission, to come up with a concise set of 
circumstances it thinks justifies the use of military force while acknowledging the fact there is no 
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universally accepted single list of criteria falling under the rubric of “exceptional circumstances.” 
The Commission’s rationale are based on the following principles:  just cause, right intention, 
last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects and right authority.
163
  
 
Just Cause  
For there to be a just cause, there must be actual physical evidence or imminent likelihood of 
large scale loss of life, intentional or not, due to state commission or omission; or the evidence of 
existence or prospect of large scale ethnic cleansing. If these two conditions are met, it assumed 
there is just cause. These situations would typically include those actions defined by the 
framework of the 1948 Genocide Convention ie crimes against humanity and the violations of 
the laws of war; situations of state collapse and the resultant exposure of the population to mass 
starvation and/or civil war; and in the instance of massive environmental catastrophe causing or 
threatening to cause large scale loss of life and the state’s unwillingness or inability to cope.164  
But how just was ECOWAS’ cause at the time of intervention? Then, it confronted two different 
but interrelated issues, humanitarian concerns arising out of the rebel war, and the issues of 
democracy and good governance following the overthrow of a democratically elected civilian 
administration. The ICISS position on the latter is quite unambiguous. It states that “in cases 
where a population, having clearly expressed its desire for a democratic regime, is denied its 
democratic rights by a military take-over,”165 that does not constitute an instance of  just cause. 
The case of a humanitarian catastrophe in Sierra Leone having been previously established, the 
question then becomes whether, on its own, the overthrow of a civilian government constitutes 
sufficient justification for military intervention under the rules of Responsibility to Protect. In a 
sense, this is the wrong question. What we should be discussing here is whether the overthrow 
and the humanitarian crisis are separate, compartmentalized issues or whether they constitute 
two sides of the same coin? Before answering this question however, it must be established 
whether ECOWAS’ actions in Sierra Leone qualify as humanitarian intervention recognized 
under international law. This is to distinguish it from the mere existence of a humanitarian 
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situation within the confines of a nation state, where there can be no justifiable use of external 
force  aimed at halting it. 
The use of the term “humanitarian intervention” here “describes the threat or use of force by a 
state or group of states designed to compel a sovereign to respect fundamental human rights in 
the exercise of its sovereign powers.”166 To qualify as humanitarian intervention, “the sole 
objective of the intervention must be to end or prevent human rights violations.”167 It is quite 
clear from the preceding definition that humanitarian intervention covers a very narrow spectrum 
and is very specific and concise as to what can and cannot be considered an issue of pure 
humanitarian concern. 
The official mandate of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone was the restoration of democracy. 
Significantly, the definition offered above is silent on this very important issue. Does ICISS’s 
silence on the issue of restoration of democracy as a humanitarian concern  necessarily preclude 
it from being considered as case for humanitarian intervention? We must bear in mind that there 
are more than a few high profile examples of restoration of democracy as a humanitarian issue. 
They include such instances as the U.S interventions in both Somalia and Haiti.  In the case of 
the latter, the UN Security Council actually authorized the move in the name of humanitarian 
intervention.
168
 There are a few other examples of corroborative  events elsewhere in the world. 
Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 and Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1979 were 
both criticized by the UN General Assembly as unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign country, although  both were widely acclaimed as credible attempts to remove clear 
dangers to international peace and security.
169
 In the specific case of Sierra Leone, from a purely 
legalistic point of view, the ECOWAS mission is not considered humanitarian intervention 
largely because of lack of UN’s imprimatur.      
Despite this assertion, the thesis will continue to characterize the issue as humanitarian 
intervention for reasons that will be clarified later. Now, this thesis considers the humanitarian 
intervention and President Kabbah’s reinstatement two sides of the same coin for a variety of 
reasons. It has already been stated elsewhere that one of the major causes, if not the major cause, 
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of the rebel insurrection was the years of misrule by successive governments and a culture of 
neo-patrimonialism that had so chocked off oxygen to civil society that a violent eruption was 
almost inevitable. This eruption, when it happened, claimed the lives of an estimated 75,000 
people and displaced another 2.1 million out of a population of roughly 4 million.
170
  
The international community led by ECOWAS pursued an intense diplomatic effort in the form 
of negotiations leading to peace agreements and sanctions to try to stop the violence. As a matter 
of fact, just before the putsch that sent the Kabbah government into exile, the rebels had signed a 
brand new  peace agreement with the government in November 1996 under the auspices of 
ECOWAS, which specifically mandated the demobilization of rebel fighters and their 
reintegration into civilian society. If the takeover were allowed to stand, it would have a 
decidedly adverse effect on a number of crucial issues. First, it would mean that over five years 
efforts and exertions would have been wiped away by that singular act. Second, the chances of a 
peaceful settlement would have dwindled to zero given the fact the rebels along with renegade 
elements of the country’s military were now in power and have no more incentive to talk peace. 
Third and more ominously, the truncated experiment in democracy would have legitimated, or at 
the very least condoned rule through the barrel of a gun, along with the unintended consequence  
of encouraging who knows how many other would  be coup makers. The argument is that the 
humanitarian crisis and the need for regime change are intrinsically linked. One cannot be 
addressed without the other. In other words, the humanitarian crisis has becomes hostage to the 
reality of regime change.   The two issues taken togethe, present a compelling case for 
recognition as just cause. 
Right Intention  
Intentions are difficult but not impossible to prove. It is mostly predicated on circumstantial 
evidence, which in turn is open to all manner of interpretations. Right intent may be inferred if 
the intervention is carried out on “on a collective or multi-lateral rather than single country 
basis.”171 This is in line with the ICISS’s belief that the “primary purpose of intervention must be 
to halt or avert human suffering.”172 Certain conditions apply. Here, the opinions of surrounding 
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countries and those of the target populations carry a lot of weight. If they are favorable, chances 
are that the intent is right. Also, the decision to invade does not have to necessarily pass the 
altruism test as a certain amount of self interest is intrinsic to the human condition. 
Still on the issue of given or implied consent of surrounding countries, the regional grouping 
called ECOWAS comprises 15 independent countries, but only four, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and 
Nigeria contributed troops to the war effort. This does not constitute a quorum even under its 
own rules of engagement, but this does not, in itself, necessarily flunk the consent test, either on 
the part of the organization as a whole or the troop contributing countries in particular. A 
majority of the rest of the member countries outside of Burkina Faso and Liberia, supported the 
intervention in principle. Even Burkina Faso and Liberia did not actively oppose the move. They 
just did not support it. And the rest had very good reasons to. To put this in perspective, let us 
look at the human toll of the war, leaving aside for the moment the collateral damage incurred in 
infrastructure and lost economic opportunities. David Pratt, writing under the heading 
“Humanitarian Situation,” had this to say about Sierra Leone at the time: “There are 700,000 
displaced people internally and another half a million refugees outside Sierra Leone’s 
borders…unofficial estimates put the number of people living in rebel controlled areas without 
access to humanitarian aid at close to 1.5 million…of particular note is the plight of women and 
children who have borne the worst of the atrocities inflicted by the rebels. Refugee camps and 
hospitals are full of children who have had one or more limbs amputated, the youngest witnessed 
being less than four years old.”173 
Describing the same situation as a “complex humanitarian crisis”, Melrose paints the picture of a 
country that had descended into the abyss of human degradation and abject deprivation. “Some 
people who had already been living in camps for displaced persons…were displaced again…As 
a result of the rebels’ terror tactics, large portions of Freetown itself had been destroyed…Many 
deaths had occurred as a result of summary execution by the rebels. People had at times been 
burned alive, including some by being thrown into burning buildings.”174 These types of 
horrifying tales of human suffering were commonplace and were corroborated by both eye 
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witness accounts and verifiable sources. As far as support from regional neighbors go, ECOWAS 
Foreign Ministers, in a meeting in 1997 in Conakry, Guinea declared as their objective, the 
following measures: imposition of sanctions, enforcement of an embargo, and possible use of 
force
175
to rid the country of the AFRC/RUF junta.  All this was done in a bid to stop human 
suffering. It was a collective decision with very few dissenting voices, meaning that most or all 
of the ingredients of good intent were in place prior to the act. 
Last Resort and Proportional Means  
Last resort simply means that every reasonable peaceful avenue of conflict resolution must first 
be explored before force is used in the event of a humanitarian crisis. What it does not mean is 
that every conceivable option in the book must first be tried in a sort of pre-determined sequence. 
The general inference is that the international community must be seen to have made genuine 
good faith attempt to peacefully resolve a conflict before going down the military coercion route. 
Consequently, if a decision to use force is made, “the scale, duration and intensity of the planned 
military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in 
question,”176 in line with the requirements of proportionality. The implications are that 
interveners must adhere strictly to laws governing humanitarian intervention in order to preserve 
the political, cultural and economic structures of the host country. 
From the onset of the rebellion in 1991 to the time of intervention in 1998, there were 
documented attempts by ECOWAS to mediate a peaceful end to the violence. The most 
comprehensive was the Foreign Ministerial conference in Guinea Conakry in 1997. To ensure 
compliance with the Peace Plan mooted by the organization, Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and 
Guinea were mandated as a contact group to monitor the situation. They met on 17
th
-18
th
 July 
with representatives of the AFRC/RUF junta, the Kamajors and ECOMOG
177
 with the stated 
purpose of stringing together a settlement that would be palatable to all sides. In subsequent 
meetings in July and August of the same year, ECOWAS Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of Staff 
and representatives of the OAU and the UN, approved sanctions against the junta.
178
 The contact 
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group went as far as referring its sanctions and embargo decisions to the UN Security Council   
for approval.
179
 It (UN Security Council) adopted Resolution 1132 giving legal recognition to the 
ECOWAS initiative which provided for, among others, the cessation of hostilities, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and the return of refugees and displaced 
persons.
180
 This UN gesture, along with the numerous peace deals that were attempted and/or 
signed with the RUF prior to this were a demonstration of the international community’s 
commitment to the process of negotiations. Could they have done more to push the peace 
initiative? Possibly, but what had been done up to that point could not be discounted. 
The proportionality issue pushes us into the realm of subjectivity and hypothetical analysis. The 
actual fighting to remove the AFRC/RUF junta was over in a relatively short period of time. All 
the same, there were human casualties and other collateral damage which could have been 
avoided if there was no invasion in the first place. On the other hand , given their record, who 
knows what other outrages the regime would have perpetrated if it was left in place longer than it 
was. On the face of it, the amount of force used appears to be reasonable given the fact there was 
no report of large scale loss of life and property during the operations to dismantle the illegal 
regime and drive the rebels away from Freetown. 
Reasonable Prospects 
Use of force can also be justified if there are reasonable prospects that it will succeed, provided 
other relevant conditions are present. Reasonable prospect doctrine looks at the whole forest and 
not just the trees. Every violent conflict has the potential to escalate and draw in interested 
outside parties or even major powers if not properly handled. There is evidence Burkina Faso 
and Liberia backed the rebels.  If these two countries had strong militaries, and were willing to 
use them on behalf of the rebels, the prospects of an ECOWAS success would have been 
considerably diminished, rendering moot any talk of military action.  
The example of Cote d’Ivoire further illustrates this point. France has a large well armed military 
garrison based there and it is difficult to imagine ECOWAS seriously contemplating any kind of 
military intervention there without French approval given the overwhelming superiority of 
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French military firepower. This raises the question of double standards in international relations. 
The ICISS’s position, while not likely to assuage critics, charts a rational middle ground. It states 
that “the reality that interventions may not be able to be mounted in every case where there is 
justification for doing so, is no reason for them not to be mounted in any case.”181 Sierra Leone 
in 1998 was a humanitarian crisis by any definition and thanks to years of corrupt neo-
patrimonial rule by a succession of greedy politicians, it had very little by way of functioning 
formal state institutions, much less a capable fighting force. In purely mathematical terms, the 
odds of a successful military intervention in such a milieu were generally very good. 
 
 
Right Authority  
The conduct of international affairs is predicated on the preponderance, not the absolute 
applicability, of the rule of law, customs and also of precedence. Although there are other 
acknowledged reasons for state conduct such as the pursuit of national interests, the rule of law 
comes across as a reasonable or even desirable point of reference. The question of right authority 
in state practice therefore takes on an increasingly important resonance in the global political and 
diplomatic arena. Even if one is able to establish a prima facie case of Responsibility to Protect 
in Sierra Leone, an equally important corollary issue of the right authority must be adequately 
addressed before any military action can be considered legitimate. The determining factor here is 
who is the right authority to determine when a sovereign state’s territory can be breached? In 
other words, who or what constitutes the legal authority to make such a call.  
One such entity is the UN which was set up primarily to maintain global peace and security. To 
that end, it has drawn up rules and regulations  that govern the conduct of interstate and intra 
state relations. Article 2.4 of the Charter of the UN. It states: “All Members shall refrain…from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”182 Article 2.7 of the 
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same charter also prohibits the UN from intervening “…in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state,”183 although what constitutes “matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state” is open to debate. In the pursuit of the maintenance of international 
peace and security, it conferred on the Security Council “…the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”184  
Chapter VI spells out the mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Chapter VII 
tackles the elements “…of the existence of any threats to the peace, breach of the peace or any 
acts of aggression.”185 If the Council considers such actions as embargoes, sanctions and 
diplomatic isolation inadequate to deal with grave threats to the peace like those mentioned 
above, it reserves the right to take such “…actions by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.”186 Article 51 also recognizes the 
“inherent right of individuals to collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
member of the UN.”187 Chapter VIII   gives legal expression to the role of regional security 
organizations with the caveat that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.”188 
Authorization however could turn an intervention into a legalized enforcement action, “…thus 
constituting a permissible exception to the prohibition of the use of force of Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter.”189  
Going by the preceding definitions, it is clear that the UN, along with other recognized regional 
organizations, have the primary responsibility and authority to make such calls. The then 
President of the Security Council condemned the military takeover in Sierra Leone on more than 
one occasion and called for the unconditional and immediate restoration of civilian rule. In 
adopting Resolution 1132, the Council determined that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a 
threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of its own Charter.
190
 Although 
delegates did not call for outright military intervention, their “…statements demonstrate the 
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Resolution sought to reinstate Sierra Leone’s elected government.”191In addition, the Council 
imposed sanctions on the regime in Freetown, authorizing ECOWAS, in cooperation with the 
legitimate government of Sierra Leone, “…to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of 
this resolution…”192 
It has been stated already that the Security Council Resolution 1132 did not explicitly call for 
military intervention. However, subsequent events after the fact appear to support the idea that 
the UN “…welcomes the fact that the rule of the military junta has been brought to an end.”193 
This is known as the ex post justification. The question of whether or not it is legal for the 
Security Council to approve of an event ex poste facto is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is 
important here is the fact that there is circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Council was not 
unhappy with the turn of events in Sierra Leone at the time. This “evidence” came in the form of 
a statement from the then President of the Security Council on the 26
th
 of March, 1998. He 
welcomed the “…fact that the rule of the military junta had been brought to an end…furthermore 
the Council commended the important role of ECOWAS towards the peaceful resolution of the 
crisis,”194 and encouraged ECOMOG to proceed in its efforts, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
The African Union’s (AU) security architecture also provides some sort of legal cover for the 
kind of military action seen in Sierra Leone, although it too falls under the ex poste facto 
phenomenon. The AU, formerly the Organization of African Unity, was founded in 1963 to 
promote African unity. It became the African Union in 2002 with greater emphasis being placed 
on economic integration and security. Although its constitutive framework prohibits meddling in 
the internal affairs of member states, Article 4 promotes “…the right of the Union to intervene in 
member states pursuant to the decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.”195 It also recognizes the right of member states “…to 
request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.”196 This could be done 
without the consent of the target state if it is for the purposes of averting state collapse, war 
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crimes, genocide and human protection.
197
 All these revolve around the institution of the Peace 
and Security Council (PSC), modeled along the lines of the UN Security Council and with 
similar powers. It was granted 18 specific powers ranging from the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to the authorization of military intervention in AU member states.
198
 
However, AU’s charter giving it direct authority to order military intervention on the continent 
directly contradicts the UN Charter’s provision specifically mandating its own Security Council 
as having the ultimate and “…primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.”199 A compromise was worked out in which the UN Security Council retains 
original powers of authorization, but accepting that “…in certain situations, such approval could 
be granted post hoc in circumstances requiring urgent action.”200 This amounts to a wink and a 
nod to the fact that the AU (and for that matter any legitimate regional organization) could 
legally authorize military interventions in member states and only later notify the UN Security 
Council. The significance of this development lies in the recognition of the importance of the 
maintenance of security in many parts of the world. In any case, this arrangement between the 
AU and the UN lends quite a bit of weight to whatever pronouncements or actions comes out of 
the AU in terms of security. It also encourages home grown solutions to Africa’s security 
problems instead of the default position of outsourcing their collective destinies to outside 
powers who may not necessarily have the right answers nor the best interests of the continent at 
heart. 
Some observers point to ECOWAS’ own protocols as a source of authority. This point of view is 
rooted in the idea that West Africa has a “security regime” which is at the core of the drive  to  
preserve  regional peace and security. A regime in this context is defined as “…a set of 
principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor interests converge 
in a given area.”201 A close reading of ECOWAS’ founding Charter and Protocols suggests that a 
security regime does indeed exist and is underpinned by expectations of reciprocity. This regime 
is reflected in the new 1993 revised treaty where, as discussed elsewhere in this paper, there was 
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a palpable paradigm shift from economic policy issues to “…peace and security imperatives.”202 
This new ECOWAS pragmatism would later find a concrete expression in a new development 
paradigm the Community calls “ Security First”203 initiative. This translates in practice to what 
some experts call a Regional Security Complex (RSC). An RSC is a “…group of states whose 
primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another.”204 This analysis provides the appropriate 
context in which to address the theoretical ramifications of ECOWAS’ security engagements in 
the region. 
And so to answer the question as to whether ECOWAS had the “Right Authority” to intervene in 
Sierra Leone, it is important to clarify its standing vis-à-vis the UN Charter. ECOWAS 
“…maybe regarded as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN’s Charter”205 for the 
purposes of intervening in conflicts within its jurisdiction. The regional body’s first 
comprehensive efforts at addressing its security needs which was the 1978 Protocol on Non-
Aggression, represented “…a valuable statement of intent and a demonstration of goodwill that 
exists among national leaders of the West African region…[and] signifies the willingness and 
commitment by member states to restrict their sovereignty in a new era,”206 in order to secure for 
themselves the blessings of collective security. The defining phrase here is “willingness and 
commitment by member states to restrict their sovereignty.” Coupled with the recognition of 
ECOWAS as a legitimate regional grouping under the UN Charter, there is very little argument it 
constitutes the right authority, or at least one of the right authorities, under the doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect.  
That is not all. The history of the protocols themselves lend credence to the idea that ECOWAS 
constitutes “Right Authority” under the R2P doctrine. When ECOWAS came up with the 
Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD) in 1981, it sketched the outlines for 
“…tackling internal armed conflict within any member state engineered and supported actively 
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from the outside likely to endanger security and peace in the entire community.”207 This 
solidified  the foundation of the aforementioned “new security thinking” that linked state security 
with people security across the entire region although it declined to get involved in conflicts 
inspired from within. The notion of collective defense which was nurtured in 1978 was 
systematically defined in 1981, shaping a comprehensive system of rules and regulations 
amounting to what may be termed a “security regime,” a “…sub-system with a tacit aim of 
ensuring and securing sub-regional stability.”208 With expectations of mutual dependency 
signified by their agreement to seek and maintain membership, each member state tacitly 
acknowledges its share of benefits and responsibilities. “Non-compliance with regime rules, 
norms and principles or perceived threats to accepted rules, norms and principles by either 
member states or other external forces can lead to either coercive or diplomatic response by other 
regime members.”209 Based on the above norms, ECOWAS ministers meeting in Conakry, 
Guinea, issued a communique in which they “…called for the reinstatement of the legitimate 
Government of Sierra Leone by use of force.”210 This communiqué was accepted by the Security 
Council Resolution 1132 without any modifications, thus lending credence to the claim that there 
was indeed a legal  basis for its military action in Sierra Leone. 
And there is also the issue of the role of the deposed former president of Sierra Leone, Ahmed 
Tejan Kabbah in facilitating ECOWAS’ intervention in his country. In state practice, it is 
generally recognized that a government, any government, in effective control of the territory of a 
sovereign state, is legally recognized to act on behalf of that state. Legitimacy is irrelevant 
here.
211
 On that basis, and that basis alone, Tejan Kabbah had no authority to call for outside 
intervention when he did, as he was then exiled in Guinea when he made the pronouncement. 
The rebel/military junta in power in Freetown constituted legitimate authority for the purposes of 
calling for third party military intervention in Sierra Leone at the time. 
However, there has been a noticeable paradigm shift in the interpretation of what constitutes 
“effective control” since the 1990s. President Jean Bertrand Aristide’s election, subsequent 
overthrow and reinstatement marked the beginning a subtle shift in thinking on the question of 
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“effective control”. During Aristide’s period in exile, the international community including the 
UN continued to refer to the military regime in Port-au-Prince as the “illegal de facto regime” 
while calling Aristide the legitimate head of state.
212
 The trend was continued in Burundi in 
1996. Then, a group of military officers violently overthrew the elected civilian government and 
installed itself in Bujumbura, effectively controlling Burundian territory.
213
 However, Burundi’s 
neighbors rejected the government and announced a total trade embargo, forcing the junta to 
reinstate parliament. 
The rebel/military junta in Freetown faced the same almost unanimous international 
condemnation in 1996. This chorus was led by the regional organization, ECOWAS. It not only 
condemned the putsch, but demanded in no uncertain terms the unconditional restoration of 
constitutional rule. These three cases suggest a tentative reformulation of the “effective control” 
rule, which in turn had implications for President Kabbah . What it meant was that, despite his 
loss of control over state territory, he was still viewed by the international community as the 
legitimate government of Sierra Leone. His request for outside military assistance was therefore 
a legitimate request for assistance from a head of state.
214
 His legitimacy informed ECOWAS’ 
decision to launch a humanitarian intervention in Sierra Leone and the context within which the 
doctrine of  the Responsibility to Protect is addressed. 
 
5.4  Conclusion        
Analyses of the theoretical underpinnings of ECOWAS’ humanitarian intervention in Sierra 
Leone reveals some very serious shortcomings, but also some very encouraging developments. 
The Responsibility to Prevent obligates the international community to take certain pre-
determined proactive measures to prevent violent conflict from erupting and failing that, 
implement a certain blueprint to prevent it from escalating, and ultimately averting or stopping 
humanitarian crisis. What transpired in Sierra Leone was the story of an organization that lacked 
the institutional capacity and perhaps the political will to act to prevent impending disaster. The 
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measures it took to prevent conflict were piecemeal, uncoordinated actions with very predictable 
results. 
However, when it came time to react to a conflict that was already blazing out of control and 
threatening the stability of an entire region, ECOWAS stood up and was counted. Despite  
pessimists’ assertion that the Sierra Leonean action was a classic example of how not to organize 
humanitarian intervention outside the ambit of the UN, ECOWAS’ performance in that theatre 
achieved the stated purpose of putting a peace process back on track through the reinstatement of 
the democratically elected government of  Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. It also underscored the utility 
of collective action and capacity building in a region that is not known for either. ECOWAS’ 
responsibility to react consisted mainly of a self declared mandate of stopping human suffering 
through the restoration of the democracy, if necessary by force of arms. This in itself, is a 
contradiction in terms. But arguably, they had the force and backing of international law, 
customs and convention. 
After stabilizing a conflict situation, ECOWAS was obliged under the tenets of the 
Responsibility to Protect, to help rebuild the target country. However, ECOWAS handed over 
control of the country back to the UN soon after reinstating the deposed civilian administration. 
Since the scope of the thesis does not extend beyond this period, there is very little said here on 
this aspect of the doctrine.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to argue that ECOWAS’ military intervention in Sierra Leone spanning the 
period 1997/1998 was justified based on a number of assumptions. What it does not do is stake 
out a position whether or not the  ECOWAS mission was successful. “Success” as a term is too 
loaded and too subjective, and involves value judgments that are well beyond the scope of the 
thesis. The word “ justification” here is used largely within the context of a narrative that 
sidelines altruistic notions of “good” and “bad,” and argues that there is a certain intrinsic 
redemptive quality in stopping mass murder, which, on the surface, does not easily lend itself to 
ascriptive explanations. It means that certain individual actions taken by ECOWAS can and may 
be construed as successful or unsuccessful. For instance forcing the military/rebel coalition 
government out of power in Freetown, thereby saving the civilian population from further 
misery, could be seen as a positive development. On the other hand, the decision by ECOMOG 
High Command to lob shells into civilian areas in a bid to flush out rebels is regrettable and 
cannot be justified under any circumstance. The analyses presented here is wholistic in outlook, 
and  outcomes takes precedence over individual actions. Well meaning critics may disagree with, 
condemn or even commend specific ECOWAS undertakings in Sierra Leone. That in itself does 
not necessarily take anything away from the principal thesis argument that based on its own 
protocols and the doctrine of R2P, ECOWAS was justified in intervening in Sierra Leone when it 
did.  
The preceding statement is, to some extent, reflected in the fallout from ECOWAS’ episodic 
events in Liberia and Sierra Leone. We are referring here to the 1999 Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and 
the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. These two protocols are significant mostly 
for the fact that their existence owes everything to these two conflicts. The idea behind the  
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention was to institutionalize structures and processes, to 
collectively manage regional security issues.
215
 The new strategic vision embodied in this 
Protocol transformed the region from being an “ECOWAS of States” into “ an ECOWAS of the 
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peoples.” In regard to the question of deadly conflict within states, ECOWAS gave itself the 
mandate to enforce peace within the region, provided certain conditions are met. These 
conditions include  “ …aggression or conflict within any member state or threat thereof…the 
case of internal conflict that threatens to trigger humanitarian disaster or that pose a serious 
threat to the peace and security in the sub-region.”216 And for good measure, it added that 
“ECOWAS shall intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and to restore life to 
normalcy in the event of crisis, conflict and disaster.”217 
The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, on its part, makes clear that in the event of 
tension between sovereignty and supra-nationality, and between regime security and human 
security, the conflict shall be progressively resolved in favor of supra-nationality and human 
security respectively.
218
 The preponderance of supra-nationality over sovereignty is perhaps the 
most significant of these new realities, as it undid in one fell swoop the notions of absolute 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nations states in the region. 
Reading the preamble to both protocols, there is little doubt that the introduction of  such radical 
ideas were motivated by prior events in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Legality and aesthetics aside, 
the provisions are proving to be visionary. Current events in LA Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, where 
ECOWAS forcefully intervened, (albeit without the use of military force) thereby averting 
potential crisis, is testimony to this vision. In the case of La Cote d’Ivoire, the conflict was 
already been played out, but ECOWAS’ decision to use economic and diplomatic sanctions 
clearly averted the resumption of all out war.   
The  Sierra Leonean intervention, as a purely political act, assuages the common revulsion that is 
felt by most decent human beings in the face of massive violations of  human dignity and human 
rights in a way that transcends the need for theoretical and intellectual explanations. Some Afro-
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optimists “…see this as the dawn of Africa’s political and economic renewal, or an African 
renaissance.”219 The jury is out on that.     
The literature review reveals no consensus on the subject of ECOWAS’ intervention in Sierra 
Leone. The negative reviews were largely based on the question of legality of the use of force in 
international relations, couched in the language of Westphalian notions of sovereignty and the 
nation state, and the UN’s seeming injunction on the inviolability and the territorial integrity of 
member states, not to mention the vast array of negative legal opinions on the issue. These are 
entirely legitimate propositions. 
One of the objectives of the thesis was to make the case that as a matter of practical necessity, 
ECOWAS had a duty to intervene in Sierra Leone that went beyond  simple dictates of state-
centric notions of territorial integrity and national sovereignty . What this means is that although 
legal and academic theories and opinions are useful mainstays for the operation and also for the 
explanation of the international system and interstate relations, they cannot be held to be 
sacrosanct when doing so would perpetuate glaring injustice and allow an unbearable situation to 
continue. The situation in Sierra Leone at the time, if left unresolved, would have engendered far 
more dire consequences than anything the intervention may have done wrong. 
This assertion was backed up first by briefly revisiting the historical antecedents to the conflict. 
The histories of both ECOWAS and Sierra Leone provide an elaborate backdrop to the thesis 
arguments. It is a matter of historical record that ECOWAS was formed for the express purpose 
of regional economic integration, and later metamorphosed into a regional security organization. 
This was done in response to the realization that security and development are interlinked in the 
sub-region and that one cannot be achieved without the other. It is equally true that the civil war 
in Sierra Leone pushed what was left of the state over the precipice, taking along with it the lives 
and properties of tens of thousands of civilian non-combatants. ECOWAS at the time had 
developed the requisite internal structures and the operational experience of having previously 
intervened in a similar situation in Liberia, to mount a credible interventionist effort in Sierra 
Leone. The novelty here was not the use of force per se, but the reasons for which it was used. 
For the first time in modern African history, a regional organization decided to use force to 
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reinstate an ousted civilian leader and in the process create an enabling environment to stop a 
crippling humanitarian crisis.   
Some of the assumptions underlining the justification are based on a theoretical superstructure of 
the security architecture of various international institutions like the UN, the African Union, and 
the Commonwealth, to which all ECOWAS members belong. And then there were also the 
enabling articles of ECOWAS itself. The Protocols on Mutual Defense and Non-Aggression are 
ECOWAS frameworks which specifically dealt with conflict resolution and the use of force 
under properly defined circumstances. They called for, among other things, the establishment of 
a standby force made up of units from the armed forces of member states to be used for these 
purposes. 
On another level, “facts on the ground” provide another potent justification for why ECOWAS 
had to do what it did. It is assumed, with good reason too, that all bonafide members of the 
group, and that includes Sierra Leone, understood that membership came with duties, 
responsibilities, and privileges some of which mandate adherence to and faithful execution of the 
rules and regulations of the organization. As a signatory to the treaty and all the other protocols 
that make up the combined body of rules and regulations of the organization, Sierra Leone was 
bound by any and all the decisions taken by  the collective. The founding charter of ECOWAS, 
revised in 1993, made it clear that member countries could ask for help or “mutual assistance” in 
the event of a military or humanitarian emergency. President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, although in 
exile in Guinea, remained the de jure leader of the state and was recognized by ECOWAS as 
such. He  specifically wrote to the organization asking for military help to restore his 
administration. Arguments about the constitutionality of his demand notwithstanding, ECOWAS 
was bound by protocol to give it.  
When the Organization of African Unity became the African Union, it too revised its treaty. 
Much of the new thinking here too centered around issues of security and peace with an 
“…increased visibility and an elevated profile in the conflict management arena.”220 Some of the 
articles in the African Union’s New Charter signed in 2002, especially those dealing with 
security issues, bear direct resemblance to ECOWAS’s own security protocols. It is difficult to 
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imagine this was mere coincidence. Even before it became the African Union, the OAU 
“…supported the activities of ECOWAS and the UN in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone.”221  
During the 90s, there were more than a few high profile meetings between member states of the 
OAU and the international community to find ways to form a pan–African peacekeeping force to 
“put squarely on Africa’s shoulders the responsibility of keeping the peace in the continent.”222 
Although nothing concrete came out of those meetings, it was clear that both the international 
community and the Africans themselves realized that the time had come for Africans to take 
responsibility for securing their own safety and well being. ECOWAS’ mission in Sierra Leone 
could be seen as a manifestation of that realization.   
Similarly, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s prescriptive 
analysis of humanitarian crisis assumes certain positions that seem to vindicate the ECOWAS 
mission in Sierra Leone. First, it speaks about the international community’s obligation to help 
prevent humanitarian catastrophe, making clear, however, that the primary responsibility lies 
with individual states. Experience shows that most, if not all, the states in the region were either 
unwilling or unable to shoulder that responsibility. ECOWAS  as a group, was no better at the 
time. It could even be argued with a great deal of justification that the Sierra Leonean state was 
at the time actively involved in perpetrating violence against its own citizens. The state at that 
point was represented by the combined resources of the military junta and the rebels. 
 Having established the existence of a humanitarian catastrophe, the question then became how  
to stop it and who or what, should? The concept of R2P sheds some light on this. It obligates the 
international community to intervene provided certain basic conditions are met. The tenets 
embodied in the Responsibility to React places the international community squarely on the spot 
if certain trigger events are activated as a result of state collapse or willful endangerment of 
civilian lives on a massive scale. The international community here, is represented by ECOWAS 
because contextually, this thesis is about ECOWAS. Based on arguments that have already been 
made elsewhere, it was in the interest of regional peace and security for ECOWAS to right a very 
bad situation. No attempt was made, however, to analyze ECOWAS’ responsibility to rebuild 
because responsibility was handed over to the United Nations after the intervention phase. 
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Finally, what lessons have been learned? The intervention was not about securing minority 
rights. Instead, it dealt with restoring democracy as a basis for transition from war to peace, for 
stable social, political and security order.
223
 Pre-intervention conventional policy prescriptions on 
politics in West Africa called for agencies like the UN to play the lead role in resolving the many 
interminable conflict situations in the region. Local involvement was severely  limited due to the 
top down approach adopted by the international community. Whatever local involvement 
existed, was heavily influenced by external peace groups and other multi-lateral agencies. 
However, these approaches have been mildly successful at best. In some instances, they have 
actually exacerbated the situation, because, for the most part, the cultural dynamics of the 
African polity, were overlooked.  
What happened in Sierra Leone, and indeed Liberia, was in direct contradistinction to the 
prevailing top down approach of that period. This new paradigm can be viewed within the 
context of “African solutions to African problems.” This concept does not necessarily denote an 
intrinsically superior African values system. In this war, so to speak, the tools are not even 
necessarily African. What it means is that whatever tools were being used, local or foreign, were 
adapted by, and for the benefit of the protagonists/beneficiaries. It is no longer a question of 
“here’s what you have to do.” Significantly, it is more like “I am going to do it my way.” The 
input and output are owned by the people directly affected, and that makes a big difference in 
West Africa’s ability to build capacity to redress some of these issues on their own. The Sierra 
Leone initiative and the lessons gleaned from it provide empirical evidence of the vast 
possibilities inherent in the phenomenon of encouraging Africans to take control of their own 
destiny. It is a practical basis on which to question and seek alternatives to the status quo. 
Also, it is suggested that the impact of the emerging concept of “African solutions to African 
problems” on the political and economic life of countries especially in Sub-Saharan Africa 
should be empirically examined. A more structured look at local or regional solutions to 
everything from serious conflict situations to adaptations of market economics to country 
specific contexts could do a lot to inform solutions to the problems that currently bedevil the 
landscape in this part of the world. 
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